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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

CaseNo.981795-CA

v.
MARCO VILLALOBOS,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction of aggravated robbery, a first
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999), and theft by receiving,
a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1999) (in Add. A).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)0) (1996).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue 1. Should this Court reach defendant's claims that the prosecutor violated
his constitutional rights by failing to offer him a plea bargain where defendant failed to
preserve that claim or to support the claim with legal analysis or pertinent authority?

Because the trial court did not rule on this issue, no standard of review applies.
Issue 2. Should this Court reach defendant's challenge to the presentence
investigation report where defendant has failed to include a copy of the presentence
investigation report in the record on appeal?
Because the trial court did not rule on this issue, no standard of review applies.
Should this Court reach the merits of defendant's claim, it should review the question of
whether the trial court properly complied with its legal duty as a matter of law. State v.
Veteto, 2000 UT 62,1[13, 6 P.2d 1133.
Issue 3. Did defendant's trial counsel render ineffective assistance when he did
not request a cautionary jury instruction on the unreliable nature of the co-defendant's
testimony?
Where, as here, a defendant is represented by new counsel on appeal and the
record is adequate to review an ineffectiveness claim, this Court reviews the claim as a
matter of law. State v. Chacon. 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998). To prevail on a claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel, defendant must "show that trial counsel's
performance was deficient in that 'it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,'
and that the deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of the trial." State v. Garrett,
849 P.2d 578, 579 (Utah App.) (quoting Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 688,
104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)), cert, denied. 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993).

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The text of constitutional, statutory, or rule provisions pertinent to the resolution of
the issues presented on appeal is contained in or appended to this brief, including:
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6) (1999).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
After participating in a carjacking and home invasion robbery on January 16, 1998,
defendant was charged with one count of aggravated robbery, a first-degree felony under
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999), and one count of theft by receiving, a second-degree
felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1999) (R. 1-2). A jury convicted him as
charged on July 14, 1998 (R. 232, 339: 96). The trial court sentenced defendant to serve
five years to life in prison on the aggravated robbery conviction, and one-to-fifteen years
on the theft by receiving conviction (R. 318-19, 344: 15). The court ordered the
sentences to run concurrently (R. 318, 344: 15). The court also refused to impose a group
crime enhancement charged against defendant (R. 314, 341: 13).
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 326). The Utah Supreme Court
transferred the appeal to this Court by order dated April 1, 1999 (R. 336). After briefing,
defendant moved to remand the case to the trial court under rule 23B, Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, which motion this Court granted, in part, by order dated April 21,
2000 (R. 343). The trial court held an evidentiary hearing, issued a Memorandum
Decision dated August 23, 2000, and returned the matter to this Court (R. 353-52).

I

Defendant successfully moved to strike the original briefs and supplement the record with
the Memorandum Decision, and a new briefing schedule was set.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 1
Defendant, known to his friends as "Sniper," was "chilling" and drinking with his
buddies William Screws and Jeff ("Baby Face") Richman at Richman's house during the
evening of January 15, 1998 ( R. 2, 338: 82, 151). The three men began to discuss
"[g]oing to this guy's house and getting some bud [marijuana]" (R. 338: 82-83). They did
not plan to pay for the "bud" (R. 338: 83, 122-23).
Defendant was not a stranger to Steve Tiede, the intended victim. Three weeks
earlier, defendant had participated in an armed home invasion robbery of Steve's place
(R. 338: 6).2 Then, as now, defendant wanted marijuana (id).

!

The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. See State v.
Loose, 2000 UT 11, f2, 994 P.2d 1237.
2

At trial, before jury selection, defense counsel moved to exclude evidence of the
prior incident (R. 338: 5). Responding to the motion, the prosecutor described the
circumstances as follows: "The prior incident involved [defendant,] occurred three weeks
earlier, same victims, same manner, invading the same apartment, with the same object
and the same purpose.... [Defendant has] been convicted by a jury. That's a felony" (R.
338: 8). The prosecutor argued that evidence of the prior offense might be relevant to
prove identity or method of operation (id.). The trial court refused to exclude the
evidence (R. 338: 7).
4

The Carjacking
Because the three friends needed a car to get to Steve's place, they set out on foot
to "jack" one (R. 338: 83-84, 101, 123-24, 126). They brought with them a screwdriver
and other tools to "[break] the ignition" (R. 338: 84, 124).
Because Saturns are "easy to steal," the men selected a purple Saturn parked in a
driveway several blocks away (R. 338: 85,125, 149, 233). Screws kept lookout while
defendant and Richman got into the car and "started messing" (R. 338: 85).3 After about
10-15 minutes, the porch light went on, and the three fled (R. 338: 85, 101, 126).
Minutes later, they returned to tinker with the ignition some more - this time successfully
(R. 338: 85-86).
Defendant started the car, and the men drove back to Richman's house to pick up a
15 inch metal pipe, 2 to 3 inches in diameter, which they intended to use to steal the
marijuana (R. 338: 68, 86, 164). Approximately two hours had elapsed since they left
Richman's house to steal the car (R. 338: 84).
The three friends next went to another friend's home, where they met Mo
Fonohema and Richard "Psycho" Houston (R. 338: 86). They asked Fonohema and

3

Richman's testimony differed. He stated that defendant kept lookout while he and
Screws worked to break the car's ignition (R. 338: 125, 148-49). Under Utah's
accomplice liability statute, however, defendant was equally culpable under either
scenario. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1999).
5

Houston "if they wanted to go pick up two pounds [of marijuana] with us" (R. 338: 129).
Fonohema and Houston "said yeah" (id.).
In the early morning hours of January 16, the five men got in the Saturn and drove
to the Orem home Larry and Barbara Barton shared with their three children (R. 338: 6263, 65, 129).
"They 're Here Again "
Barbara's son Steve Tiede, 20, and his friends Mark, Ashley, and Tony were
playing Nintendo 64 in Steve's room over the garage when they heard a car pull up (R.
338: 62-65). Mark looked out the window and saw the Saturn backing up the driveway.
Defendant and his friends got out of the car, walked around the back of the garage,
entered the sliding glass door, and ran up the stairs (R. 338: 63, 88). At the top of the
stairs, defendant, Screws and Richman put on ski masks Screws had stolen from WalMart
for the occasion, "just in case anything went wrong" (R. 338: 88, 162, 164). Screws
draped a stocking cap over his hand to make it appear that he had a gun (R. 338: 90).
Richman carried the pipe, Screws carried a 2" by 4" with nails sticking out of it, and
defendant wielded a crowbar (R. 338: 68-70, 134, 195, 202-03).4
The men knocked once on Steve's door and burst in (R. 338: 90, 156). They
started "yelling and telling everybody to get on the ground" (R. 338: 90). Screws and

4

Since neither Fonohema and Houston carried weapons, defendant must have had
the crowbar (R. 338: 186, 339: 31-32).
6

Fonohema threatened to shoot the victims if they did not cooperate (R. 338: 198). The
men demanded marijuana, but, as Richman recalled, Steve "wouldn't give it to us" (R.
338: 136). Richman waved the metal pipe over Steve's head as though to hit him (R. 338:
71). The robbers ransacked the room, taking the Nintendo 64 and games, Steve's stereo,
CDs, the victims' wallets, a pager, keys, and two amps (R. 338: 72-73, 138, 230, 246).
Larry and Barbara Barton heard a commotion as they lay in bed in their room
down the hall from Steve's room (R. 338: 211, 228). Barbara got up from the bed and
said, "They're here again" (R. 338: 212, 222). Barbara charged out of the room, yelling
"What's going on?" (R. 338: 73). Steve's friend Ashley yelled back, "It's happening
again" (id.).
The robbers fled, or tried to (R. 338: 73, 91, 141). Inside Steve's room, Mark
tackled Screws, and he and Steve restrained him (R. 338: 73-74). As Barbara and Larry
came out of their room, they saw the two other masked men in the hallway (R. 338: 215).
Richman threw the metal pipe at Barbara, striking her cheekbone (R. 338: 212, 214-15).
Larry came up behind Barbara and picked up the pipe (R. 338: 214). The robbers ran
down the stairs, with Barbara and Larry right behind (R. 338: 214-15, 229). Richman
headed straight for the car (R. 338: 141, 230).
Barbara flung herself at defendant and landed on his back (R. 338: 229). Clad in a
nightgown and barefoot, Barbara struggled with defendant in the snow-covered backyard,
pounding on his back (id.). In the scuffle, defendant dropped a stolen Nintendo 64 game

7

and a boombox (id.). The slippers he was wearing came off his feet (id.). When Barbara
heard Ashley yell that she had the car's license number, Barbara backed off (R. 338: 230).
Defendant ran to the car, joining Fonohema and Richman (R. 338: 217, 230).
Meanwhile, Larry, in his underwear, chased Houston out to the driveway (R. 338:
178, 182-83, 219). Larry and Houston fell to the ground in a struggle, and Larry was hit
in the elbow with the pipe (R. 338: 219-20). Someone in the car's front seat yelled out,
"just shoot him," and Larry backed away (R. 338: 220). Houston jumped in the back seat,
and the car sped off (R. 338: 142, 178, 250).
Shortly afterward, police located the Saturn, lights on and engine running, a few
blocks from the Richman home. (R. 338: 260-61, 272). Defendant and his friends were
located shortly thereafter and arrested (R. 338: 273-74).
Defendant was still shoeless at the time of his arrest (R. 338: 284).
The Outcome
Screws gave police a videotaped confession (R. 252). He pled guilty to firstdegree felony aggravated robbery and second-degree felony theft by receiving-the same
charges of which defendant was convicted (R. 338: 79). Pursuant to a plea agreement,
the prosecutor recommended that he serve no prison time, and the trial court suspended
his prison term but sentenced him to jail (R. 338: 80, 97). Screws testified for the
prosecution in defendant's trial (R. 338: 79-117). His plea bargain required only that he
provide truthful testimony (R. 338: 80, 111-12).
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Richman also gave police a videotaped confession (R. 252). He pled guilty to
first-degree aggravated robbery and second-degree felony possession of a stolen vehicle
(R. 338: 119). Like Screws, he received a suspended prison sentence and a jail term (R.
338: 119, 160). He testified for the prosecution in defendant's trial pursuant to a plea
agreement requiring that he give truthful testimony (R. 338: 118-69).
Fonohema was a juvenile at the time of the offense (R. 338: 170). He admitted in
juvenile court that he had possessed a stolen vehicle (R. 338: 180, 184). He also testified
for the prosecution in defendant's trial (R. 338: 170-89).
Neither Houston nor defendant confessed (R. 252). Houston and defendant were
tried together on the same charges (R. 338: 60-61). Houston was acquitted of aggravated
robbery, but convicted of receiving stolen property (R. 339: 98).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Point I. Defendant claims that by not offering him a plea bargain, the prosecutor
denied him equal protection and due process. However, since defendant did not
specifically raise his claim before the trial court, he is precluded from asserting it on
appeal. Furthermore, the claim is inadequately briefed because defendant has failed to
support it with legal analysis or relevant authority. For those reasons, this Court should
decline to address his claim. However, if the Court reaches the merits, it should still
refuse to disturb defendant's sentence because the prosecutor's decision not to offer

9

defendant a plea bargain was a legitimate exercise of prosecutorial discretion, and did not
violate defendant's constitutional rights.
Point II. Although defendant claims that the trial court erred in failing to address
alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, this Court should refuse to
reach defendant's assertions because he failed to include the presentence investigation
report in the record on appeal.
Even if the Court reviews defendant's allegations of error, he is not entitled to
relief. Any remand to the sentencing court should be for the limited purpose of
addressing the single allegation of an inaccuracy in the report's presentation of
defendant's employment history inasmuch as the sentencing judge did not address this
point on the record, and the accuracy of the remaining three alleged inaccuracies is clear
on the record.
Point III. Defendant fails to establish either deficient performance or prejudice in
his trial counsel's not requesting a jury instruction cautioning the jury as to the
unreliability of the testimony of Screws and Richman implicating defendant in the
charged offenses. The parties fully explored the potential biases and motives of both
witnesses during trial and argued their respective views of the witnesses' credibility to the
jury in closing. The jury was fully instructed as to its responsibility to determine the
credibility and weight of the testimony, and defendant establishes no right to an additional
instruction further suggesting that the witnesses were biased. Even had it been given,

10

such an instruction is not likely to have produced a different outcome where the jury
already had and rejected all the information argued by defendant on appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT HE WAS DENIED EQUAL
PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS BECAUSE THE
PROSECUTOR DID NOT OFFER HIM A PLEA BARGAIN IS
UNPRESERVED AND INADEQUATELY BRIEFED;
FURTHERMORE, THE CLAIM FAILS ON THE MERITS
Defendant asserts that he was denied equal protection because the prosecutor did
not offer him a plea bargain. Br. of Aplt. at 15. He maintains that the prosecutor's failure
to offer him a plea bargain was a "punishment" not inflicted on codefendants Screws and
Richman, who were offered plea bargains. LI at 17. He claims that the prosecutor's
failure impermissibly penalized him for (1) exercising his right to remain silent and (2)
being affiliated, at least in the prosecutor's mind, with a street gang. Id. Additionally,
defendant cites as controlling the due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and
article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution. Id. at 2.
This Court should decline to reach defendant's claim because he failed to preserve
it. Additionally, the claim is inadequately briefed because it is not supported by legal
analysis or pertinent authority. However, even if the Court chooses to reach the merits,
the law does not support defendant's claim.

11

A.

Defendant Failed to Preserve His Claim,
It is well settled that a claim of error must be presented to the trial court in a

timely and specific manner in order to preserve an issue for appeal. See State v.
Winward. 941 P.2d 627, 633 (Utah App. 1997); State v. Beltran-Felix. 922 P.2d 30, 33
(Utah App. 1996); State v. Pugmire. 898 P.2d 271, 272-73 n. 4 (Utah App.), cert, denied.
910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995); State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358, 359-60 (Utah App. 1993). As
the Utah Supreme Court has stated,
A general rule of appellate review in criminal cases in Utah is that a
contemporaneous objection or some form of specific preservation of claims
of error must be made a part of the trial court record before an appellate
court will review such claim on appeal." Importantly, the grounds for the
objection must be distinctly and specifically stated.
State v. Johnson. 774 P.2d 1141,1144-45 (Utah 1989) (citation omitted) (emphasis
added). It is a "long-established policy [of appellate review] that the trial court should
have the first opportunity to address the claim of error." State v. Anderson. 929 P.2d
1107, 1109 (Utah 1996) (citing State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993)); see also
State v. Rangel. 866 P.2d 607, 611 (Utah App. 1993).
In the proceedings below, defendant never claimed, as he appears to argue on
appeal, that the prosecutor's failure to offer him a plea bargain entitled him to receive
probation and jail time rather than a prison sentence.

Instead, in a post-trial Motion to

Declare Statute Unconstitutional, he claimed that the sentencing enhancement for group
criminal activities provided under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1999) should not be

12

imposed because it was unconstitutional under numerous provisions of the U.S. and Utah
constitutions (R. 256-74) (in Add. B). Point VII of defendant's memorandum was titled
"The Conduct of the Prosecutor in this Case Constitutes a Violation of the Defendant's
Due Process Rights and Thus the Group Crime Enhancement Statute Should Not be
Imposed" (R. 256). Add. B. In Point VII, defendant claimed that "in order to remedy that
wrong [the prosecutor's failure to offer him a plea bargain], this court should, in effect,
give [defendant] the plea bargain which was offered to the co-defendants. The gang
enhancement penalty should not be imposed" (R. 254-55). Add. B.
While two of the paragraphs in defendant's written argument on appeal were
presented to the trial court, they were offered in a completely different context: that of a
motion requesting that the trial court find the group crime enhancement unconstitutional
(R. 256-55, Br. of Aplt. at 15-17). Add. B. Although the trial court declined to declare the
statute unconstitutional, the court nevertheless gave defendant the precise relief he sought
by declining to impose the sentencing enhancement (R. 314, 341: 13) (in Add. B).5
Having received the remedy he requested in the trial court, defendant should not be
allowed on appeal to recast his challenge to the group crime enhancement statute as a

In the trial court's words, "It's not unconstitutional for me to impose a Group
Crime Enhancement, but I believe it is noteworthy that no other participant in this action
has had to face a Group Crime Enhancement.... [Defendant's] relative youth and the
fact that no other defendant has been sentenced to an enhanced crime in this matter, I
think justify a finding that it would be in the interests of justice not to impose the Group
Crime Enhancement
" (R. 341: 13). Add. B.
13

general constitutional attack on the propriety of the prosecutor's choice not to offer him a
plea bargain.
In short, defendant failed to preserve the specific claim he raises on appeal.
Therefore, this Court should decline to address it.
B.

Defendant's Claim is Inadequately Briefed,
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires an appellant's argument

to contain the "contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues
presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court,
with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Utah's
appellate courts have consistently declined to address inadequately briefed issues because
"a reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority
cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of
argument and research." State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988) (quoting
Williamson v. OpsahL 416 N.E.2d 783, 784 (111. App. 1981)); see also Burns v.
Summerhavs, 927 P.2d 197, 199 (Utah App. 1996). "Utah courts routinely decline to
consider inadequately briefed arguments." State v. Bryant. 965 P.2d 539, 549 (Utah App.
1998); see also State v. Wareham. 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) (declining to address
argument on the ground that defendant's brief "wholly lacks legal analysis and authority to
support his argument").
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Nowhere in defendant's brief does he attempt to fit this case into any analytical
framework relating to either equal protection or due process. For example, defendant does
not allege that he is a member of any protected class, or that he is being subjected to any
form of invidious discrimination, or that any impermissible discriminatory intent underlay
the prosecutor's actions. Absent such analysis, defendant cannot show a violation of his
right to equal protection.
A due process analysis is equally lacking. In fact, the argument section of
defendant's brief does not even mention due process, despite defendant's professed
reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment and article I, section 7.
In short, defendant has failed to give this Court any guidance as to which (if any)
test, standard, or analytical formula should apply to his equal protection or due process
claims. Furthermore, defendant cites no authority that requires a prosecutor to offer a plea
bargain or holds that failure to offer a plea bargain constitutes a punishment.6 Because

6

Defendant cites only two cases in support of his claims, neither of which is on
point. First, defendant relies on North Carolina v. Pearce. 395 U.S. 711 (1969), as
support for his claim that a prosecutor cannot punish a defendant for having exercised his
constitutional rights. In Pearce, the U.S. Supreme Court held that where a defendant is
sentenced to a longer term following a successful appeal of an earlier conviction, a
presumption attaches that the longer subsequent sentence was the result of vindictiveness,
or a "retaliatory motive on the part of the sentencing judge." IdL at 725. Pearce is
inapplicable to the case at bar. First, the case was expressly overruled as to the
presumption of vindictiveness by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 190 S. Ct. 2201
(1989). Second, the Pearce court's concern was a retaliatory motive "on the part of the
sentencing judge," rather than, as alleged here, a prosecutor. Third, the punishment at
issue in Pearce was a judicially-imposed sentence, not a prosecutor's offer of a plea
bargain.
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defendant has failed to support his claim with legal analysis or pertinent authority, this
Court should refuse to consider it.
C

On the Merits, the Prosecutor Properly Exercised His Discretion in
Declining to Offer Defendant a Plea Bargain.
"[Tjhere is no constitutional right to plea bargain." Weatherford v. Bursey. 429

U.S. 545, 561 (1977). In Weatherford, the Court rejected a claim that an undercover
investigator's duplicity in posing as a co-defendant deprived the defendant of the
opportunity to plea bargain. Id. The Court held that "the prosecutor need not [engage in
plea bargaining] if he prefers to go to trial. It is a novel argument that constitutional rights
are infringed by trying the defendant rather than accepting his plea of guilty." Id. The
Court also recognized that plea bargaining is not a unilateral process that can only be
initiated by the prosecution. Id. The Court correctly observed that defense counsel could
have approached the prosecutor himself. Id
The U.S. Supreme Court has characterized the breadth of a prosecutor's discretion
as follows:

Second, defendant relies on Bordenkircher v. Haves. 434 U.S. 357 (1978), which
likewise does not constitute pertinent authority. In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that no due process rights were violated when a prosecutor, having told a defendant that
he would be charged as a habitual offender if he did not accept a plea bargain, followed
through with the promise. Id at 365. Although defendant states that Bordenkircher
interpreted Pearce as standing for the general proposition that a defendant may not be
penalized for having exercised a constitutional right, Br. of Aplt. at 16, Bordenkircher
expressly recognized that Pearce is restricted to its facts. Id at 667-68. In fact,
Bordenkircher is more helpful to the state than to defendant. See text of Point 1(C), infra.
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In our system, so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the
accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to
prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests
entirely in his discretion. Within the limits set by the legislature's constitutionally
valid definition of chargeable offenses, "the conscious exercise of some selectivity
in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation" so long as "the
selection was not deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race,
religion, or other arbitrary classification."
Bordenkircherv. Haves. 434 U.S. 357, 364-65 (1978) (quoting Ovler v. Boles. 368 U.S.
448, 456 (1962)).7 A prosecutor's discretion extends to "whether to enter into plea
bargains and the terms on which they will be established." Young v. United States. 481
U.S. 787, 807(1987).
The broad discretion afforded prosecutors stems largely from the recognition that
[T]he decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review. Such
factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution's general deterrence
value, the Government's enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship
to the Government's overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to
the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake. Judicial
supervision in this area, moreover, entails systemic costs of particular
concern. Examining the basis of a prosecution delays the criminal
proceeding, threatens to chill law enforcement by subjecting the
prosecutor's motives and decisionmaking to outside inquiry, and may
undermine prosecutorial effectiveness by revealing the Government's
enforcement policy. All these are substantial concerns that make the courts
properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute.

7

In Bordenkircher. the court denied a Kentucky prisoner's petition that alleged a
due process violation when a state prosecutor carried out a threat made during plea
negotiations to reindict the petitioner on more serious charges if he did not plead guilty to
the offense with which he was originally charged. 434 U.S. at 363-65. The court held
that inasmuch as the petitioner "was plainly subject to prosecution" on the more serious
charges, no violation occurred. Id. Similarly, in this case, defendant was "plainly subject
to prosecution" on the charges for which he stood trial.
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Wavte v. U.S., 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985).
Defendant claims that the prosecutor improperly "singled out" defendant because
he "refused to give a video confession or otherwise cooperate with the police at the time
of his arrest."8 Br. of Aplt. at 16. His contentions fail for several reasons.
First, the Utah Supreme Court has rejected the argument that some defendants are
denied equal protection because they receive prison sentences while others do not. See
Herman v. State. 821 P.2d 457, 458 (Utah 1991) (rejecting claims of denial of equal
protection and due process as a result of receiving minimum mandatory prison sentences
for convictions of child sex offenses while others convicted of same crimes received
suspended sentences and probation). The Court ruled that "inasmuch as plaintiffs received
the sentences required under the law, their rights to equal protection were not violated."
Id. at 458.
Second, given the United States Supreme Court's statements in Weatherford that
constitutional rights are not infringed by trying a defendant rather than plea bargaining, the
failure to offer a plea bargain cannot be regarded as a basis for vacating defendant's
sentence or as a form of punishment. In any event, defendant would not necessarily have
been better off if he had received a plea bargain. Although the prosecutor offered plea

Defendant also claims that "the prosecutor refused to offer a plea bargain to
[defendant] because he was a 'known' gang member." Br. of Aplt. at 17. That
contention fails, inasmuch as defendant acknowledges that codefendants Screws and
Richman - also gang members - were offered plea bargains. Id
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bargains to Screws and Richman, he did not reduce the severity of the charges to which the
codefendants pled guilty. Pursuant to the policy of his office in offering plea bargains to
suspected gang members, he required that both Screws and Richman plead guilty as
charged: Screws pled guilty to the same offenses for which defendant was tried, and
Richman pled guilty to first- and second-degree felonies (R. 1-2, 247-46; 338:79-80, 119).
And, although the prosecutor recommended suspended sentences and jail terms rather than
prison incarceration for Screws and Richman, a prosecutor's sentencing recommendation
does not bind the trial court. See Utah R.Cr.P. 11(g)(2) ("any recommendation as to
sentence is not binding on the court"). Neither defendant had any right to expect that the
trial court would follow the prosecutor's recommendation. Instead, it came down to the
individual defendant. As the trial court explained:
Defendant is not being ill-treated because he stood on his constitutional
right to remain silent, thus forcing a jury trial, while the two codefendants
each pled guilty, thus waiving their right to remain silent. Rather, defendant
faces a sentence with the same maximum potential penalty the two
codefendants faced. That they received a probationary sentence rather than
a prison commitment has much to do with their individual and separate
criminal histories and their recognition of their own wrongful conduct, thus
evidencing a significant potential for rehabilitation.
(R. 315). Add.B.
Third, the prosecutor's decision not to offer a plea bargain was not founded on an
"unjustifiable standard" under Bordenkircher. Instead, the decision was based on an
objectively valid reason. In the prosecutor's words, "the co-defendants were willing to
bargain, [defendant] was not" (R. 280). The prosecutor clearly believed that the evidence
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of defendant's guilt was strong enough to support a jury verdict, and chose not to initiate
plea negotiations which, given defendant's refusal to confess or otherwise cooperate,
would likely prove futile.
Fourth, public policy weighs heavily against defendant's claim. Under
defendant's argument, any prosecutor who chooses to try a defendant who has "exercised
his right to remain silent" without first offering a plea bargain will have denied that
defendant due process and equal protection. For this Court to rule in defendant's favor
would, in effect, require prosecutors to offer plea bargains to all defendants who refuse to
admit wrongdoing or testify against codefendants, and would make failure to do so a
violation of constitutional magnitude. Such a result would be absurd.
POINT II
THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR THE LIMITED
PURPOSE OF ALLOWING THE TRIAL COURT TO RESOLVE
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO THE PRESENTENCE
INVESTIGATION REPORT
Defendant asserts that the trial court failed to comply with Utah Code Annotated §
77-18-l(6)(a) (Supp. 1998) (in Add. C), in failing to address certain alleged inaccuracies
in his presentence investigation report ("PSI"). Br. of Aplt. at 19-20. Defendant argues
that consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's decision in State v. Jaeger. 1999 UT 1, 973
P.2d 404, his case should be remanded with instructions that the trial court comply with
section 77-18-l(6)(a). Br. of Aplt. at 20. However, he failed to include a copy of the
report in the record on appeal. Therefore, this Court should decline to consider the claim.
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Moreover, even on the merits, reversal is not warranted, and a remand is not appropriate
on all four of defendant's claimed inaccuracies.
A.

Review is Not Warranted Because of Defendant's Failure to Include the
Presentence Investigation Report in the Appellate Record,
"When a defendant predicates error to [an appellate court], he has the duty and

responsibility of supporting such allegation by an adequate record. Absent that record,
defendant's assignment of error stands as a unilateral allegation which the reviewing]
court has no power to determine. [An appellate court] simply cannot rule on a question
which depends for its existence upon alleged facts unsupported by the record." State v.
Longshaw. 961 P.2d 925, 928 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Wulffenstein. 657 P.2d
289, 293 (Utah 1982), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044, 103 S. Ct. 1443 (1983)). "An
appellate court's 'review is . . . limited to the evidence contained in the record on appeal.'
. . . Therefore, we will not consider evidence which is not part of the record. 'When
crucial matters are not included in the record, the missing portions are presumed to
support the action of the trial court.'" State v. Pliego. 974 P.2d 279, 280 (Utah
1999)(citations omitted)); see also State v. Theison. 709 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1985); see
also State v. Mitchell 671 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah 1983); State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755
(Utah 1982). Confronted with an inadequate record on appeal, the appellate court must
presume the regularity of the proceedings below. State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405
(Utah 1986) (per curiam); see also State v. Blubaugh. 904 P.2d 688, 699 (Utah App.
1995), cert, denied. 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996).
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In State v. Eloge. 762 P.2d 1 (Utah 1988), the issue on appeal was whether the
trial court had abused its discretion in denying defendant's request for a 90-day
diagnostic evaluation. Id at 1. Eloge argued that the court abused its discretion by
unhesitatingly following the recommendations of the presentence report, but he failed
to include the presentence report in the record on appeal. Id. at 2. The Utah Supreme
Court concluded that since Eloge had failed to provide the court with a copy of the
presentence investigation report, the court was unable to "determine whether the trial
court's use of that report amounted to an abuse of discretion." Id. (citing State v.
Robbins. 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985)).
"[Tjhe presentence investigation report does not become part of the record on
appeal unless a 'party or a party's counsel notifies the court clerk, in writing, that the
presentence investigation report is the subject of an appeal.' Utah Code Jud.Admin.
R4-203(2) (1993). Upon such notice, 'the clerk shall include the sealed presentence
investigation report as part of the record.' I d " State v. Nuttall. 861 P.2d 454, 458
n.l2(UtahApp. 1993).
A presentence investigation report provides information that assists the trial court
in determining an appropriate sentence. The information can come from a variety of
sources, and be presented in a variety of contexts. Some of the content may be based on
opinion and may be neither quantifiable nor objectively verifiable. For example, the
presentence investigation report may contain widely disparate accounts of the crime
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provided by the defendant, witnesses and victims. In addition, the presentence
investigation report may contain editorial comment on the part of the person drafting the
report. The report also contains criminal and social history that may influence the trial
court's sentencing decision. Because information in a presentence investigation report
can vary widely in its impact and significance depending on where in the presentence
investigation report the information is placed, the materiality of particular facts or
assertions can only be evaluated by referring to the presentence investigation report
itself
Without the report, this Court lacks sufficient information to review the claim on
appeal. The Court cannot see for itself the context in which the alleged inaccuracies
were set forth or whether the inaccuracies, if any, materially affected the sentencing
recommendation. Therefore, the Court cannot determine whether a remand is warranted
in this case.
Completing the record on appeal is the responsibility of the appellant. Since
defendant failed to provide an adequate record, this Court should decline to address
defendant's challenges to the presentence investigation report.
g.

State v. Jaeger Does Not Apply on the Facts of This Case,
Defendant asserts that State v. Jaeger. 973 P.2d 404 (Utah 1999), controls this

case. In Jaeger, the presentence investigation report contained information acknowledged
by the prosecutor to be inaccurate. Id. at 412. The errors were significant, including
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representations that the victim was "unusually vulnerable," her injuries were "unusually
extensive," and the offense was characterized by "extreme cruelty [and] depravity." Id. at
412. The use of those terms indicates that the erroneous information impacted Jaeger's
sentence. Despite the parties' agreement that the information was inaccurate, the trial
court refused to amend or modify the presentence report. Id The Utah Supreme Court
remanded the case, instructing the trial court, in accordance with section 77-18-l(6)(a), to
"'make a determination of [the] relevance and accuracy [of the report] on the record.'" Id.
at 413 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(a) (1998)).
Jaeger does not apply here. First, this Court should not attempt to apply Jaeger
where the presentence investigation report is not even before the Court. In Jaeger, the
Court was able to review the presentence investigation report and observe that errors
existed, and that the errors were material to Jaeger's sentence. Here, the report is absent.
Second, Jaeger is readily distinguishable on its facts. In Jaeger, the trial court refused to
modify the report despite the prosecutor's acknowledgment that the presentence report
was inaccurate. 973 P.2d at 412. Here, the State disputes defendant's allegations of error
(R. 341:8, 10-11) (in Add. C).
C.

If a Remand is Warranted, it Should be for the Limited Purpose of Resolving
Only One of Defendant's Alleged Inconsistencies.
Should this Court review the merits of defendant's claim and consider a remand to

the sentencing court, the State believes that the remand should be for the limited purpose
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of allowing the trial court to resolve only one of defendant's objections to the PSI. The
sentence, however, should not be disturbed.
Section 77-18-l(6)(a) provides in relevant part as follows:
. . . Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which
have not been resolved by the parties and the [Department of Corrections]
prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge,
and the judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve the
alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten working
days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make a
determination of relevance and accuracy on the record.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(a). Add. C. As explained by the Utah Supreme Court in
Jaeger, compliance with this section "requires the sentencing judge to consider the party's
objections to the report, make findings on the record as to whether the information
objected to is accurate, and determine on the record whether that information is relevant
to the issue of sentencing." Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, f44. "Whether the trial court properly
complied with a legal duty is a question of law that [the appellate court] review[s] for
correctness." State v. Veteto. 2000 UT 62, f 13, 6 p.3d 1133.
While the absence of the PSI from the record on appeal prevents this Court from
verifying the context in which the alleged inaccuracies occurred, the record permits a
broad determination of whether the challenged portions are inaccurate and whether the
claims were dealt with on the record pursuant to section 77-18-l(6)(a) and Jaeger. A
review of the record reveals that three of the claimed inaccuracies are, in fact, not
inaccurate, making a review for action by the sentencing court an exercise in futility
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inasmuch as the veracity of the challenged statements is already clear on the record. As
only one of the four claimed inaccuracies has no resolution on the record, any remand
should encompass only that one allegation.
Defendant stole a car. Defendant was represented at sentencing by his current
counsel. That counsel was not trial counsel. When he raised the first claimed inaccuracy
in the PSI, the following exchange occurred:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: On page 2 it indicates in there that Mr. Villalobos
stole an automobile prior to this crime.9 It's my understanding the evidence at trial
was that William Screws and Jeff Richman stole that vehicle.
[PROSECUTOR]: Actually I don't believe that was the evidence at
trial. I believe the evidence was that Screws, Richman and Villalobos were
all together when the car was taken.
THE COURT: Thank you.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I was not trial counsel, so I hope I have not
misstated the evidence on that.
[PROSECUTOR]: I would refer the court to the findings of fact as
far as Gang Enhancement, Finding Number 2.
THE COURT: Thank you.
(R. 341:7-8) (in Add. C).10
9

The parties treated this as a reference to stealing the Saturn which they used to
accomplish the home invasion robbery of which they were convicted. "[P]rior to this
crime" simply means chronologically, stealing the Saturn came before the robbery, but
they were all accomplished in one night.
10

The findings referenced by the prosecutor on this issue are not in the record on
appeal. They should have been attached to the document entitled "Submission of
Findings of Fact" but are not (R. 234-33). It is unclear whether the trial court ever
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From this exchange, it can be seen that the sentencing judge and both parties
viewed the issue settled by the findings, which were represented to establish that
defendant was found to have stolen the vehicle. Moreover, defendant was charged with
and convicted of receiving stolen property based on his involvement in the stealing of the
car (R.l-2, 214, 232). Further, the trial testimony was uncontroverted that Screws,
Richman, and defendant stole the Saturn, breaking its ignition and driving it away (R.
338: 83-86, 123-26, 149-50). In fact, Screws testified that defendant was the one who got
the car started (R. 338: 86). The sentencing judge presided at trial and was well aware
that the evidence that defendant stole the car was consistent and undisputed. At that point
in the proceedings, with defense counsel having expressed on the record his recognition
that he may have misstated the facts, and with defense counsel's misunderstanding of the
evidence apparently corrected, the trial court had no need to address the matter further.
Accordingly, the representation in the PSI that defendant stole a car in connection with
this crime was accurate and was reflected on the record, and no further "correction" by
the trial court was necessary.
Value of stolen goods. Defense counsel then represented that the PSI noted that
$3,000 in computer equipment was stolen:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The other issue is on page 3. It talks about
$3,000 in computer equipment. It's my understanding the evidence at trial
indicated it was maybe a couple hundred dollars, plus a Nintendo. A

executed those findings (R. 341:11-12).
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Nintendo probably doesn't cost a few thousand dollars. In fact probably
more in lines of a hundred dollars or two hundred dollars. So I think the
total amount of damage would probably be more in the line of $300 not
$3,000.
(R. 341: 8).11 Add. C. The sentencing judge thereafter imposed restitution of $314.11 (R.
341:16-17) (in Add. C). At that point, the prosecutor pointed out:
[PROSECUTOR]: I looked, and it's not in this presentence
investigation, but there was a letter from the victim in this case that was
attached to the presentence report for Mr. McDonald who was a codefendant in the other case involving the same defendant, where they
carefully listed out the values of items taken on both robberies. They are
detailed there. I don't know why that letter wasn't included in this
presentence report, but it has been reported and we simply had a different
PSI writer. I'm concerned because of that. That amount hasn't been
appropriately placed before the court.
THE COURT: My order would be that restitution be paid and I'll
defer on that until you and Mr. Abbott have an opportunity to review that.
And if not, I'll impose one consistent with that letter, and if not we'll set it
for restitution hearing.
So I will order, Mr. Villalobos[,] that you pay restitution to the
victims, somewhere in an amount not less than $341.11, and it can be more
when we find out what the exact numbers are.
I will direct that either party may file a written request for restitution
hearing. [ would like that matter resolved promptly. I'm going to direct
that the matter be resolved by either agreement or request for restitution
hearing within 30 days.
(R. 341:16-17). Add. C. It is clear that the exact amount of restitution owing in this case
had yet to be determined and, hence, was not reflected in this record. However, the trial

ll

In fact, the trial testimony indicated stolen wallets, the Nintendo, video games, a
pager, a stereo, CDs, and "a couple of amps" (R. 338: 72-73, 138, 230, 246).
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court made the only practical correction available to it, thereby meeting the requirements
of section 77-18-l(6)(a) and Jaeger. The court rejected the $3,000.00 figure in the PSI as
inaccurate and imposed restitution in the amount of $341.11, which apparently had some
basis in the record and was an amount consistent with defendant's claim below that it
should be about $300.00 (R. 341:8). Add. C. Because there apparently was a letter in
existence detailing the value of the stolen property, the court reasonably gave the parties
the option of reviewing that letter and agreeing on an appropriate amount or setting a
restitution hearing to establish an amount, with a deadline of 30 days in which to act (R.
341:16-17). Add. C. Both parties agreed to this decision, leaving the court to believe that
if a restitution hearing were needed or any change in the amount already imposed was
required, it would be notified by the parties within thirty days (R. 341:17). Add. C. No
such notification occurred. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to see how the
sentencing judge could have more fully complied with Jaeger and section 77-18-l(6)(a)
with regards to the restitution amount. Moreover, any error in the judge's failure to
thereafter reconvene and finalize its $341.11 order with written findings was invited by
defendant's failure to object to the $314.11 amount or to request a restitution hearing,
thereby preventing the sentencing judge from determining whether a different amount
needed to be imposed. See State v. Betha, 957 P.2d 611,617 (Utah App. 1998) (refusing
to review an alleged error on appeal when the complaining party invited the error below).
Consequently, no remand is necessary for this claimed inaccuracy.
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Defendant's work history. Defense counsel also pointed out below that the PSI's
coverage of defendant's employment history was incomplete:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: On page 8 where it talks about
employment, there was other employment at Intermountain Temporaries
and at the last hearing we had Mr. Babbitt, who had given Marcos some
pool related work, although it was several years ago[. I]t's my
understanding also Mr. Villalobos has also done some other odd jobs in
here in that time period.
(R. 341:8-9). Add. C.
Neither the prosecutor nor the trial court addressed this alleged inaccuracy, but
turned to another matter before the court pronounced sentence. To the extent Mr.
Babbitt's employment of defendant was not reflected in the PSI, a remand may be
appropriate for the limited purpose of determining the relevance and accuracy of
defendant's work history pursuant to section 77-18-l(6)(a) and Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, f44
(requiring the court to make findings on the record as to whether the information objected
to is accurate).
Defendant's possession of a weapon. Finally, defense counsel informed the court
below that the PSI inclusion of defendant's possession of a weapon in this crime was
erroneous:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And then on the Criminal History
Assessment, they've checked number "2," which means a weapon, Mr.
Villalobos was carrying some kind of weapon that's "other." I imagine
that's got to be a board or something like that. It's my understanding at trial
the evidence was not that Mr. Villalobos was carrying any type of weapon.
So that should be a "zero" rather than a "2" which would drop him from a
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12 to a 10 and put him in the Moderate category, rather than the Fair
category. If it's in the Moderate, that's five years under the time matrix.
(R. 341:9). Add. C. The prosecutor responded to this complaint:
[PROSECUTOR]: In regards to the weapon, there were three
specific separate weapons introduced at trial, and there was a crowbar type
of weapon and a pipe and a 2x4 with nails. The testimony was Mr.
Fonohema did not have a weapon at all. The evidence was, if he was there,
he didn't step inside, or Mr. Houston. That leaves this defendant and two
others, and three weapons. Even so, if the court concludes he didn't have a
weapon and changes his placement score, that reduced him to moderate.
But because of the nature of the crime he is still in the prison range. So it
doesn't significantly alter the disposition.
THE COURT: The only thing it may alter, if the Court made a
finding he did not use a weapon, it may be sufficient that the Board of
Pardons would treat it different.
[PROSECUTOR]: That's correct.
THE COURT: It would not alter what category on the matrix he
falls, that's correct.
[PROSECUTOR]: What the Board of Pardons will do in this case
depends upon huge measure the Defendant himself [sic], how he behaves if
he is sentenced to prison. It is a tragedy that this young man is looking at a
huge part of his life being taken away by spending it in prison. On the other
hand, it's been as a direct result of the defendant's actions. Everyone who
came in has told us he made bad choices, bad conduct. It would be wrong
to let him escape the consequence of those choices.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I don't mean to misstate the evidence, but
it was my understanding the evidence didn't show he had a weapon.
THE COURT: Thank you.
(R. 341:10-11). Add. C. While the sentencing court did not thereafter rule on the
accuracy of the PSI's representation that defendant possessed a weapon during this crime,
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there was no violation of section 77-18-l(6)(a) inasmuch as the representation was not
inaccurate. The trial evidence established that defendant was one of five men who
entered the victim's apartment, three of whom wore ski masks (R. 338: 67-71, 134-36,
193-96). The two without masks were identified as Mo Fonohema and Richard Houston,
and neither held a weapon (R. 338: 68-70, 132-34, 186-87, 194-95). Richman testified
that defendant wore one of the masks (R. 338: 132, 153). Three weapons were found at
the crime scene, and each was held by a masked man: Richman held a metal bar, Screws
carried a board studded with nails, and the third masked man held a metal pipe (R. 338:
68-70, 132-34, 139, 186, 195-96; 188). The only reasonable inference from this
evidence was that defendant was wearing a mask and that he held one of the three
weapons. Accordingly, there was no inaccuracy in the PSI's inclusion of defendant's
possession of a weapon in calculating his score on the Criminal History Assessment,
requiring no further clarification by the sentencing judge.
In any event, the trial court ultimately resolved the dispute on the record by
attributing use of a weapon to defendant. In imposing sentence, the court stated that "the
evidence at trial is that you, along with other co-defendants, entered the homes of the
victims with three weapons . . . and demanded money and property, and thereafter made
an escape" (R. 341: 14). Add. C. In so stating, the trial court necessarily rejected
defendant's challenge to the presentence investigation report and implicitly found that the
presentence investigation report accurately represented that defendant used a weapon.
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In summary, of the four claimed inaccuracies in the PSI, a remand for further
action by the sentencing judge pursuant to section 77-18-l(6)(a) and Jaeger may be
necessary for the limited purpose of addressing the accuracy of the PSI's representation
only as to defendant's employment history.
As in Jaeger, however, defendant has not argued on appeal that the alleged errors
affected his sentence, and therefore, reversal of his sentence is not required. 1999 UT

POINT III
DEFENDANT RECEIVED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL GUARANTEED BY THE CONSTITUTION
Defendant claims that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel because
his trial counsel did not expressly request a jury instruction informing the jury that the
testimony of both Screws and Richman was unreliable because of the questionable
motives behind their testimony. Br. of Aplt. at 20-21. He erroneously asserts that both
were required to "implicate defendant" as part of the plea bargains they entered and that
the absence of the requested instruction was prejudicial because no other evidence put
him at the scene of the crime. Id. at 2. 21.
Where, as here, a defendant is represented by new counsel on appeal and the
record is adequate to review an ineffectiveness claim, this Court reviews the claim as a
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matter of law.12 State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998). To prevail on a claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel, defendant must "show that trial counsel's
performance was deficient in that 'it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,
and that the deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of the trial." State v. Garrett,
849 P.2d 578, 579 (Utah App.) (quoting Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 688,
104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)), cert, denied. 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993); see also Chacon.
962 P.2d at 50. The appellate court '"indulge[s] in the strong presumption that counsel's
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.'" State v.
Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990) (quoting Strickland. 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct.
at 2065). Defendant must overcome that presumption, and may do so by proving that
there was a "'lack of any conceivable tactical basis' for counsel's actions." State v.
Mecham. 2000 UT App. 247, ^[22, 9 P.3d 777, 782 (quoting Garrett. 849 P.2d at 579)
(additional quotations omitted).

12

Although, at defendant's request, this Court remanded the case back to the trial
court for a rule 23B hearing, the specific claim of ineffectiveness raised in defendant's
brief on appeal was not addressed below. Accordingly, there are no findings of fact or
legal conclusions to be reviewed on this claim, and the normal appellate standard of
review following a 23B remand is inapplicable. See State v. Bredehoft. 966 P.2d 285,
289 (Utah App. 1998) (when reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance following a
remand for a Rule 23B hearing, this Court "defer[s] to the trial court's findings of fact,
but reviewfs] its legal conclusions for correctness") (quoting State v. Classon, 935 P.2d
524, 531 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 945 P.2d 1118 (Utah 1997)), cert, denied. 982 P.2d 88
(Utah 1999); see also State v. Mecham. 2000 UT App. 247, ^19, 9 P.3d 777.
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Defendant must also establish "at least the likelihood of prejudice." State v.
Whittle, 1999 UT 96, ^21, 989 P2d 52, This requires a showing that "but for the
deficient representation, there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been
different." State v. Gallegos. 967 P.2d 973, 977 (Utah App. 1998) (citations omitted).
Because defendant must meet both prongs of the test, the Court "may address whichever
[prong] will most readily resolve the claim." Garrett, 849 P.2d at 580 (citing Strickland,
466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. 2069); see also Mecham. 2000 UT App. 247, f21; State v.
Higgins. 920 P.2d 1195, 1199 (Utah App. 1996), cert, denied. 929 P.2d 350 (Utah 1996.)
Defendant claims that his trial counsel should have sought an instruction which
would have stressed to the jury that both Screws and Richman had ulterior motives to
testify against Villalobos, as evidenced by their plea agreements with the prosecution. Br.
of Aplt. at 20-21. He argues that their testimony was incredible because they had every
reason to falsely implicate someone else in order to avoid long prison sentences and to
obtain a recommendation from the prosecutor for probation. Id at 20-21.
Defendant relies solely on State v. Maestas. 984 P.2d 376 (Utah 1999), to support
his claim that the absence of such an instruction constitutes deficient performance. Br. of
Aplt. at 21. However, Maestas is readily distinguishable from this case. Maestas
involved the unreliability of eyewitness identification testimony in a case in which the
victims of multiple robberies testified that they recognized defendant as the robber. In
ruling that defense counsel's failure to request a cautionary jury instruction on the
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unreliability of eyewitness identification testimony constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel, the Utah Supreme Court relied on its decision in State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483,
488-92 (Utah 1986), wherein the Court held that upon request of defense counsel, the trial
court must give a cautionary eyewitness identification instruction where that
identification is a central issue. Id. at 492. In Maestas. the Court reiterated that the
requirement was based not only upon empirical studies questioning the reliability of such
identification, but also on research showing that juries do not understand the fallibility of
such identification, thereby giving it undue weight. 984 P.2d at 380. The Utah Supreme
Court recognized that the common knowledge of jurors often runs contrary to
documented research findings concerning the reliability of eyewitness testimony. Id
In contrast, this case involves the bias or motive of co-defendants whose testimony
implicates defendant in the charged crimes. Defendant presents no empirical studies or
other information establishing the unreliability of such testimony generally, and provides
no persuasive reason to extend the Maestas holding to the testimony at issue here. Hence,
Maestas does not support defendant's claim of deficient performance.
Moreover, defendant's trial counsel did not render deficient performance where he
put before the juiry all the information defendant argues on appeal. The issue is one of the
motive and bias of both Screws and Richman. Such information may be explored at trial
and the witnesses impeached pursuant to Utah Rules of Evidence 607 and 608. In this
case, the prosecutor and both defense counsel presented all the information relevant to the
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claimed bias of the challenged witnesses at trial, including the details of the plea bargains,
the sentencing recommendations, and the actual sentences imposed on each witness.13
The jury was told of the charges originally facing the co-defendants, the charges to which
they entered pleas, and the requirement in the plea bargains that the witnesses "tell the
truth." Defendant offers on appeal no evidence which was not put before the jury below.
Moreover, both defense counsel actively argued to the jury the unreliability of the
challenged testimony (R. 339: 56-62, 69-77). As defense counsel actively attempted to
impeach the witnesses pursuant to the rules of evidence, and defendant has established no
right to a jury instruction dictating the credibility of co-defendant testimony, defendant's
claim of deficient performance fails.
Neither does defendant establish the requisite prejudice to prevail on his claim.
The jury was properly instructed on its responsibility to weigh the evidence and determine
the credibility of the witnesses and the facts (R. 202). The list of relevant factors to
consider included the interest of the witness in the result of the trial, and any bias, motive
or probable motive the witness may have (id). The jury was fully able to properly
perform its responsibility under this instruction because the prosecutor and both defense
counsel presented all the information relevant to the claimed bias of the challenged
witnesses at trial. They also observed the demeanor and appearance of each witness, their

13
I
Defendant and Richard Houston were tried together but were represented by
different counsel, resulting in cross examination of witnesses by both defense counsel.
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apparent frankness and candor or want thereof, and their ability to remember. The jury
was also in a position to compare the testimony of all of the four participants who
testified as it related to the same events and to determine which, if any, were credible as
to various aspects of the offense, including defendant's participation. As all the
information, as well as defendant's argument, was already before the jury, an additional
iteration in a written jury instruction would not have significantly changed the outcome.
Accordingly, trial counsel's failure to expressly request an instruction extolling the
allegedly unreliable nature of co-defendants' testimony did not amount to deficient
performance and did not prejudice the results of appellant's trial, and defendant's
argument to the contrary is without merit.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm
defendant's convictions, but remand the case to the trial court for the limited purpose of
resolving defendant's objection to the representation of his work history in the
presentence investigation report in full compliance with section 77-18-l(6)(a).
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /X

day of June, 2001.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
ATTORNEY GENERAL

IS C. LEONARD7
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
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ADDENDA

Addendum A

76-6-302. Aggravated robbery.
( D A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing
robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section
76-1-601;
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a
robbery.
History: C. 1963, 76-6-302, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, * 7*4-302; 1975, ch. 51, ft 1;
1989, eh. 170,ft7; 1994, ch. 271,ft1.

76-6-408. Receiving stolen property — Duties of pawnbrokers.
( D A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property
of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has
been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or
withholding the property from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen,
intending to deprive the owner of it.
(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection (1) is presumed in the
case of an actor who:
(a) is found in possession or control of other property stolen on a
separate occasion;
(b) has received other stolen property within the year preceding the
receiving offense charged;
(c) being a dealer in property of the sort received, retained, or disposed,
acquires it for a consideration which he knows is far below its reasonable
value; or
(d) if the value given for the property exceeds $20, is a pawnbroker or
person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting used or
secondhand merchandise or personal property, or an agent, employee, or
representative of a pawnbroker or person who buys, receives, or obtains
property and fails to require the seller or person delivering the property to:
(i) certify, in writing, that he has the legal rights to sell the
property;
(ii) provide a legible print, preferably the right thumb, at the
bottom of the certificate next to his signature; and
(iii) provide at least one other positive form of picture identification.
(3) Every pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing in
or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, and every
agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or person who fails to
comply with the requirements of Subsection (2)(d) shall be presumed to have
bought, received, or obtained the property knowing it to have been stolen or
unlawfully obtained. This presumption may be rebutted by proof.
(4) When, in a prosecution under this section, it appears from the evidence
that the defendant was a pawnbroker or a person who has or operates a
business dealing in or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal
property, or was an agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or
Person, thai the defendant bought, received, concealed, or withheld the
Property wi&out obtaining the information required in Subsection (2Xd), then
L e burden shall be upon the defendant to show that the property bought,
reCeived, or obtained was not stolen.
(5) Subsections (2Xd), (3), and (4) do not apply to scrap metal processors as
defined in Section 76-10-901.
(6) As used in this section:
(a) "Receives" means acquiring possession, control, or title or lending on
the security of the property;
(b) "Dealer" means a person in the business of buying or selling goods.
gjjtory: C. 1963, 76-6-406, enacted by L.
1*73, eh. 196, 9 764-406; 1979, ch. 71, f 1;
1993, ch. 102, 9 1.

Crose-Reference*. — Pawnbrokers and secondhand dealers, } 11-6-1 et seq.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DECLARE STATUTE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Plaintiff,

vs.
Marco Villalobos,

Case No. 981403414

Defendant.

Judge: Schofleld

STATEMENT QF MATERIAL FACTS
1.

An Information in this case wasfiledby the Utah County Attorney.

2.

The Information charged the defendant with aggravated robbery, a 1st degree

felony and receiving stolen property, a 2nd degree felony.
3.

The defendant was further notified in the Information of a "Gang Enhancement"

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 76-6-203.1 with separate potential enhanced penalties attached for
count. The State entitled the sentencing enhancement a "gang enhancement." For purposes of
this memorandum, Mr. Villalobos has adopted the term "group crime enhancement" pursuant to
State v. Labium. 342 U.A.R. 35, 37 fo. 3 (1998). (hereafter Labrum HI).
4. On July 14, 1998, the defendant was convicted of both charges.
5. In State of Utah v Norton. Fourth District Court case no: 981403928, Brad Norton
was convicted of Aggravated Assault, a second degree felony.
6. The factual basis for the charge and conviction was that Mr. Norton stabbed a man in
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the abdomen with a knife. The cut was so deep that the victim's bowels protruded through the
abdomen.
7 In State v. Kohl, case no. 981403873, the group crime enhancement was imposed upon
the defendant.
8. In State v. Veteto, case no. 981403870, the group crime enhancement was imposed
upon the defendant.
9 The research performed by the defendant has found only one other case in which the
group crime enhancement was imposed upon a criminal defendant in Utah County That case was
State v. Wakefield, case no. 981404210.
10. The Utah County Attorney's office has policy to grant plea bargains to most criminal
defendants. The Utah County Attorney's office will not offer a plea bargain to a criminal
defendant when the defendant is suspected to be involved in a gang. Exhibit A.
11. In this case, the Utah County Attorney's office did not offer a plea bargain to the
defendant because the defendant was believed to be in a street gang and because the defendant
exercised his constitutionalrightto remain silent. Exhibit A.

ARGUMENT
I; THE PRIMACY MQPEL REQUIRES THE COURT TO FIRST hQQK AT
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION WHEN ADDRESSING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF

A STATUTE.
Pursuant to the primacy model of constitutional interpretation, the Utah Constitution
should be the primary source for protecting citizens' rights. A state court mustfirstlook to the
state constitution and develop independent doctrine and precedent. Federal questions are decided
only when state law is not dispositive. West v. Thomson Newspapers. 872 P.2d 999, 1006 (Utah

1994) (quoting Christine M. Durham, Employing the Utah Constitution in the Utah Courts. Utah
B.J., Nov. 1989. 25, 26). See also Amax Magnesium Corp v State Tax Common. 796 P.2d 1256,
1261 (Utah 1990) ("[I]f the challenged statute cannot withstand attack under the state
constitution, there is no reason to reach the federal question"). Therefore, the federal
constitutional challenges which follow need not be addressed until after the group crime
enhancement statute is reviewed under the Utah Constitution.1
H; TgE GROUP CRIME ENHANCEMENT STATUTE VIOLATES ARTICLE 1,
SECTION 12 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution guarantees criminal defendants therightto a
trial by an impartial jury. Villalobos asserts that a jury, rather than the trial court, should make the
necessary factualfindingsin regards to the applicability of the group crime enhancement as
delineated in §76-3-203.1.
The group crime enhancement statute states in part that "[t]his section does not create any
separate offense but provides an enhanced penalty for the primary offense." § 76-3-203. l(5)(a).
The Utah legislature, however, is elevating form over substance. In reality, § 76-3-203.1 does not

1

In Labrum L the Utah Court of Appeals refused to address the application or
constitutionality of the enhancement as Labrum failed to raise the issue prior to sentencing. Under
that reasoning, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's imposition of the enhancement. State
v. Labrum. 881 P.2d 900, 906 (Utah App. 1994). In LafcoimiL the Utah Supreme Court
addressed the application of the statute to Labrum and found that the failure to comply with the
statute's requirement for writtenfindingsconstituted plain error and remanded it to the trial court
for writtenfindings.State v. Labium 925 P.2d 937, 941 (Utah 1996). In Labrum III supra, the
Court of Appeals refused to address the constitutionality of the statute for a second time because
they vacated the enhancement on "straightforward statutory grounds." State v. Labrum. 342
U.A.R. 35, 37 (Utah App. 1998). The only other case in which Mr. Villalobos found a Utah
appellate court addressing the statute was State v. Ramirez. 924 P.2d 366 (Utah App. 1996). In
that case the Court of Appeals refused to reach the constitutionality of the statute because the trial
court again failed to make the necessary writtenfindingsof fact required under the statute. M at
370.

create a mere sentencing enhancement, but a new offense. The Supreme Court of Oregon has
recognized that "facts which constitute the crime are for the jury and those which characterize the
defendant are for the sentencing judge." State v Wedge. 652 P.2d 773, 777 (Or. 1982). Utah
courts should likewise recognize this distinction. Whether the offense was committed "in concert
with two or more persons" is a fact which constitutes the crime, and is therefore, a determination
which must be made by a jury. C/* State v Tillman. 750 P 2d 546, 577-80, 585-88, 591 (Utah
1987) (Justices Stewart, Durham, and Zimmerman, in separate opinions, collectively hold that
aggravating circumstances in felony cases are elements of the crime which the jury must
unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt).
Wedge involved a sentencing enhancement for use of a firearm in the commission of an
offense The Oregon court found further:
Although the challenged statute is denominated an enhanced penalty
statute, in effect it creates a new crime. The jury only considered evidence offered
on the question of first degree robbery, and convicted him of that offense, but the
defendant was sentenced on the basis of having been found guilty of the crime of
"first degree robbery using afirearm."If the legislature had actually described the
crime as "first degree robbery using afirearm"the use of thefirearmwould
certainly be an element and there would be no doubt defendant would have a right
to a jury determination of guilt The legislature cannot eliminate constitutional
protections by separating and relabeling elements of a crime.
Wedge. 652 P 2d at 778 (emphasis added).
Likewise, this court shouldfindthat commission of a crime "in concert with two or more
persons" is a new offense; and that therefore, § 76-3-203.1, which allows the sentencing judge to
determine the applicability of this section rather than a jury, is an unconstitutional violation of
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution.

IH: THE GROUP CRIME ENHANCEMENT STATUTE IS A SPFriAI LAW
THAT VIOLATES ARTICLE VL SECTION 26 OF THF UTAH CONSTITUTION
Article VI, section 26 of the Utah Constitution states: "No private or special law shall be
enacted where a general law can be applicable." This prohibition is similar in nature to both the
uniform operations of law provision of the Utah Constitution and the fourteenth amendment equal
protection clause of the federal constitution. State v. Bishop 717 P. 2d 261, 265 (Utah 1986). The
Utah Supreme Court in Bishop further recognized that there are also differences between the
prohibition against special laws and equal protection principles, although those differences have
not yet been delineated. Bishop, 717 P.2d at 265.
The Utah Supreme Court has defined a general law as one that "applies to and operates
uniformly upon all members of any class of persons, places, or things requiring legislation peculiar
to themselves in the matters covered by the laws in question... ." Bishop. 717 P.2d at 265 (cite
omitted). In addition, a general law "implies that the class created is founded upon some natural,
intrinsic, or constitutional distinction." Utah Farm Bureau v Utah Insurance Guaranty
Association 564 P.2d 751, 754 (Utah 1977). A special law, on the other hand, "classifies its
objects unreasonably, as by selecting from a general class of particular persons, places, or things
for the purpose of conferring privileges or imposing burdens." Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State.
779 P.2d 634, 645 (Utah 1989).
In Hulbert v State. 607 P.2d 1217 (1980), the Utah Supreme Court stated that under
Article VI, section 26, special laws are permitted in limited circumstances:
If a special law is required to achieve a reasonable and legitimate legislative
end, the enactment is not necessarily barred by Article VI, section 26. It is the
unreasonable isolation of an individual, or a group of individuals,fromthe general
class of persons with whom they are similarly situated, or the application of
legislative power to subjects that are not legitimately of legislative concern, that

makes a statute an impermissible special law
Bishop, 717 P 2d at 265 (citing Hulbert. 607 P 2d at 1223-24; and Utah Farm Bureau. 564 P 2d
at 754) (emphasis added). Villalobos argues that the group crime enhancement statute is an
impermissible special law Its enhanced sentences, based solely on the fact that the defendant
allegedly did not commit the crime by himself, unreasonably isolates the defendant from other
similarly situated criminal defendants. §76-3-203.1, therefore, should be struck down as an
impermissible special law in violation of Article VI, section 26 of the Utah Constitution.
IV: THE GROUP CRIME ENHANCEMENT STATUTE PROVIDES FOR
"CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT" IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE L SECTION
9 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
The group crime enhancement statute as set forth in Utah Code Annotated §76-3-203.1
and as applied in this case is a "cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of the Utah and federal
constitutions.
A.

THE GROUP CRIME ENHANCEMENT STATUTE VIOLATES THE

EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which applies to the states
through operation of the Fourteenth Amendment, states: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." In Solem v. Helm. 463
U.S. 277, 103 S.Ct. 3001 (1983), the United States Supreme Court held that "a criminal sentence
must be proportionate to the crime for which the defendant was convicted." In making such a
determination, the Court found that factors such as uthe gravity of the offense and the harshness
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of the penalty," "the sentence imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction," and "the
sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions" should be considered.
Id. at 3011.
In this case, Villalobos could be sentenced to a term of nine years to life. Without the
group crime enhancement, Mr. Villalobos would be sentenced to only five years to life. Thus, the
mere fact that the crime was committed with other persons will almost double his sentence. The
enhancement statute not only significantly increases the term to be served but also eliminates any
discretion by the Board of Pardons for release prior to the expiration of the minimum term. To
enhance the penalty by adding four years to the sentence and to eliminate the parole boards'
discretion solely on grounds of association constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment" and is in
total disproportion to the nature of the offense.
B.

THE GROUP CRIME ENHANCEMENT STATUTE VIOLATES ARTICLE

I, SECTION 9 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
Article I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution reads: "Excessive bail shall not be required;
excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted.
Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary vigor." While the language
of the Utah provision is similar to its federal counterpart, the Utah Supreme Court has held that
the last sentence of section 9 makes it plain that "the Utah provision is broader than its federal
counterpart." Bishop, 717 P.2d at 267.
In State v. Nance. 438 P.2d 542 (Utah 1968), the Supreme Court of Utah held that
defendant's "cruel and unusual punishment" challenge of a sentence of not more than five years in
state prison imposed for writing a check without sufficient funds had no constitutional basis. The
court stated that the constitutional prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment" is directed
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"against all punishments which by their length or severity are greatly disproportionate to the
offense charged." IdL, at 544. The court further indicated that although "[w]hat constitutes an
adequate penalty is a matter of legislative judgment and discretion," the courts mayfindthat the
legislature abused its discretion if the "sentence imposed in proportion to the offense committed is
such as to shock the moral sense of all reasonable men as to what isrightand proper under the
circumstances." Id.
In Bishop, the Supreme Court of Utah, adopting the factors set forth by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Solem held that the sentencing of the defendant to a sentence of a minimum mandatory
five years with a potential for a life sentence for sodomy on a child "Ms not one of those rare cases
where the harshness of the sentence is [so] disproportionate to the nature of the crime' that it
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment." Bishop, 717 P.2d at 272 (quoting State v. Amicone.
689 P.2d 1341, 1343 (Utah 1984); Sfllfim, 103 S.Ct. at 3009).
However, the group crime enhancement statute which calls for enhanced sentences of nine
years for first degreeftflonyconvictions, six years for second degree felony convictions, and three
years for third degree felony convictions, solely on the basis of association is a facially harsh
sentence in total disproportion to the nature of the crime.
V; THE GROUP CRIME ENHANCEMENT STATUTE VIOLATES THE PUE
PROCESS CLAUSES OF BOTH THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION
The United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution mandate that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. U.S. Const, amend XIV, Utah
Const, art. I § 7.

A.

THE GROUP CRIME ENHANCEMENT STATUTE IS VOID FOR

VAGUENESS
The United States Supreme Court has held that a statute violates due process protections
if it is vague or "its prohibitions are not clearly defined " Grayned v. City of Rockford. 408 U S
104, 108 (1972) In delineating when a statute is not "clearly defined" the court explained
It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for
vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined Vague laws offend several
important values First because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful
and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly
Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning Second, if
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide
explicit standards for those who apply them A vague law impermissibly delegates
policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and
subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory
application Third, but related, where a vague statute "abut(s) upon sensitive areas
of basic First Amendmentfreedoms,"it "operates to inhibit the exercise of (those)
freedoms ' Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to "steer far wider of the
unlawful zone" than if the boundaries of forbidden areas were clearly marked
Id (citations omitted)
In order to successfully challenge a statute as vague, the defendant must show the statute
fits within one of three categories: it is overbroad in its application in proscribing constitutionally
protected acts, it is facially invalid; or it is vague as applied to the specific situation of the
defendant Village of Hoffman Estates, v Flipside. Hoffinan Estates Inc.. 455 U S 489, 494-95
(1982), Utah v. Murphy, 674 P 2d 1220, 1222 (Utah 1983), Utah v, Phams, 846 P 2d 454, 466
(Utah Ct App 1993), cert denied 857 P 2d 948 (Utah 1993) As applied to the defendant, Utah
Code Annotated §76-3-203 1 is void for vagueness in two categories it is overbroad and is vague
in its application to the facts of the defendant's case

The United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court have long recognized the
right offreeassociation as it contributes to otherfreedoms.The First Amendment to the United
States Constitution states that "Congress shall make no law.., abridging.., therightof the people
to peaceably assemble." U S. Const, amend. I. The United States Supreme Court explained the
importance of therightto free association compared to other guaranteed rights. They stated:
u

[f]rom the outset, therightof assembly was regarded not only as an independent right but also as

a catalyst to augment the free exercise of the other First Amendmentrightswith which it was
deliberately linked by the draftsmen." Richmond Newspapers. Inc. v. Virginia. 448 U.S. 555, 57778(1980).
The defendant does not claim he has therightto commit crimes but simply that he can not
be punished for associating with others. The group crime enhancement statute punishes an
individual not for committing a crime (this is covered in the unenhanced sentence) but simply for
committing the crime in conjunction with other people. See §73-3-203.2(1 )(a)-(b). In fact, the
statute is not barred even if "the persons with whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert
are not identified, apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that any of those persons are charged
with or convicted of a different or lesser offense." §73-3-203.2(5)(b).
The statute attempts to diffuse this issue by stating that the statute "does not create any
separate offense but provides an enhanced penalty for the primary offense." §73-3-203.2(5)(a).
This is simply a case of form over substance. In the end, sentences in this case will be enhanced
simply because Mr. Villalobos was with others when a crime was committed.
B.

UTAH'S GROUP CRIME ENHANCEMENT STATUTE IS VAGUE AS IT

CALLS FOR ARBITRARY ENFORCEMENT
The Group Crime Enhancement directs that the sentencing judge shall decide whether to

impose the enhanced penalty on the defendant. The sections read:
(c)
The sentencing judge rather than the jury shall decide whether to
impose the enhanced penalty under this section. The imposition of the
penalty is contingent upon a finding by the sentencing judge that this
section is applicable. In conjunction with sentencing the court shall enter
written findings of fact concerning the applicability of this section.
(6)
The court may suspend the imposition or execution of the sentence
required under this section if the court:
(a) finds that the interests of justice would be best served; and
(b)
states the specific circumstances justifying the disposition on the
record and in writing.
§ 76-3-203. l(5)(c)-(6)(b).
The discretion granted to the sentencing judge by this section is vague as applied to
standards outlined by the United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court. The Court
has stated that judges should not be allowed to decide matters on "an ad hoc and subjective basis,
with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application." Gravned. 408 U.S. at 109
The Utah Supreme Court has agreed that a vague statute is any prohibition that can be
arbitrarily enforced against a defendant or a provision that would leave its enforcement against a
defendant to the discretion of enforcing officers. Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake. 817 P.2d
816,820(1991).
Under the Utah statute, the sentencing judge is not guided by specific criteria to determine
if any given defendant should be subject to the sentence enhancement. The judge is left to decide
whether to apply the statute to every person convicted of a crime in association with two other
people or only to those associated with street criminal gangs as the legislative history directs.
Further, the judge is not guided in how to determine if "the interests of justice would be best
served" by foregoing the enhancement penalty. §76-3-203.1 (6)(a). In the end, the sentencing
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judge is arbitrarily left to decide for himself whether the defendant should be subject to the
sentence enhancement.
The arbitrary nature of the enforcement is illustrated by the rarity of the actual imposition
of the enforcement. While numerous persons are charged with a group crime enhancement, many
of those charges are plea bargained away, as was done with the co-defendants in this case.
Further, judges oftentimes impose the group crime enhancement but then suspend its imposition.
Only three times, in Utah County, has a criminal defendant borne the brunt of the group crime
penalty enhancement.
C.

THE GROUP CRIME ENHANCEMENT STATUTE IS AN

UNCONSTITUTIONAL ENCROACHMENT ON FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTY
INTERESTS IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS PROVISIONS OF BOTH THE
UTAH AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS
The United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution mandate that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. U.S. Const, amend XIV; Utah
Const, art. I §7. These substantive due process provisions are aimed at the protection of
individuals against the arbitrary actions of government. See United States v. Certain Real
Property. 954 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1992). (Affirmed Dec. 6, 1995, 70 F.3d 923 (6th Cir. App. 1995).
They were created to guarantee the protection and preservation ofrights"implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty" and "fundamental to the American scheme of justice."
1 THE GROUP CRIME ENHANCEMENT STATUTE IS AN IMPERMISSIBLE ENCRQACHMENT QF FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTY RIGHTS GUARANTEED 3Y THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
In summary of the scope of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the

U S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated:
The Fourteenth Amendment embodies three different protections: (1) a
procedural due process protection requiring the state to provide individual's with
some type of process before depriving them of their life, liberty, or property; (2) a
substantive due process protection, which protects individual's from arbitrary acts
that deprive them of life, liberty, or property; and (3) an incorporation of specific
protections afforded by the Bill of Rights against the states.
Griffin v. Strong. 983 F.2d 1544, 1547 (10th Cir. 1993). The group crime enhancement statute
found in §76-3-203.1 violates the due process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment as set
forth in Griffin because it is an arbitrary act that deprives the defendant of fundamental liberty
interests as well as denies him specific protections afforded by the Bill of Rights.
First, the statute arbitrarily deprives the defendant of a fundamental right to liberty. The
statute as written is applicable any time an enumerated crime is committed "in concert with two or
more persons." The statute arbitrarily applies upon afindingthat two or more persons were
potentially involved in the commission of the crime (although they need not be charged or even
identified.) Such an arbitrary imposition of an enhanced sentence, which in this case could be 9
years in prison for Mr. Villalobos, is a fundamental violation of defendant'srightto liberty.
Second, the statute as written violates the defendants Eighth Amendmentrightagainst
"cruel and unusual punishment." See supra. As such a protection is guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights, it is incorporated as a fundamental right into the Fourteenth Amendment protections
against state encroachment.
Third, the statute seeks to punish thee defendant based solely on his association with
others. Whilefreedomof association is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, the United
States Supreme Court in N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama. 357 U.S. 449 (1958), stated: "[I]t is beyond
debate thatfreedomto engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an

inseparable aspect of the liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which embracesfreedomof speech."
2. THE GrROUP CRIME ENHANCEMENT STATUTE IMPERMISSIBLY IMPACTS
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS GUARANTEED BY THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
The due process provision of the Utah Constitution (Article I, section 7) is substantially
similar to the Fourteenth Amendment. In regards to the similarity, the Utah Supreme Court has
held that while not dispositive of state analysis, "decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States on the due process clauses of the Federal Constitution are 'highly persuasive' as to
application of that clause in our state constitution." Untermever v State Tax Commission. 129
P 2d 881, 885 (Utah 1942). Nonetheless, Utah courts have not hesitated to predicate holdings
reviewing statutory sentencing schemes solely on state constitutional principles. See, State v.
Russell, 791 P.2d 188 (Utah 1990); State v Copeland. 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988); State v
Qsnliy, 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1987); State v Bishop. 717 P.2d 261 (Utah 1986). In Condemarin
v University Hospital. 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court held that certain
provisions of the State Governmental Immunity Act which imposed limits on the amount a person
could claim against uninsured government entities because of death or injury violated the uniform
operations of laws and due process provisions of the Utah Constitution. In so holding, the court
applied a stricter standard of review to the statute than the traditional rational basis review.
Justice Durham, in an opinion concurred in part by Justices Zimmerman and Stewart stated: t%The
states asks this Court to engage in the kind of speculation about legislative rationale associated
with the 'any conceivable rational basis test.' However, because of the constitutional status of the
right to a remedy for damage to one's person under article I, section II, more is required.. The
greater the intrusion upon constitutionally protected interest, the greater and more explicit the

state's reasons must be." Condemarin. 775 P.2d at 358.
Therightof the defendant to befreefrom"arbitrary and capricious" legislative acts which
impinge on his right to liberty, and to befreefrom"cruel and unusual punishment," are
fundamental rights embodied in Article I, section 9 and in the Article I, section 7 due process
provision of the Utah Constitution. Therefore, infringement upon such a fundamental personal
right requires that the court engage in a heightened level of scrutiny in reviewing the validity of
the group crime enhancement statute.
3. THE COURT SHOULD REVIEW THE GROUP CRIME ENHANCEMENT
STATUTE UNDER A HEIGHTENED STANDARD OF SCRUTINY
Because the group crime enhancement statute encroaches arbitrarily upon fundamental
rights of liberty under both the Utah and the federal constitutions, it must be reviewed under a
standard of strict scrutiny: Is it necessary to promote a compelling government interest? And it is
narrowly tailored to that interest? Carev v. Population Services Int'l 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977);
Roe v Wade. 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1972); Shapiro v Thompson. 344 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
Protecting the publicfromthe unlawful activity of group crimes is not a compelling
governmental interest above the standard interest the government has in protecting the public
from all crime. The group crime enhancement statute as written is not necessary to the promotion
of such an interest; and it certainly is not narrowly tailored to serve such an interest as it applies
any time a crime is committed in concert with two or more persons. Other states have effectively
drafted statutes which are narrowly tailored. However, Utah's statute does not pass constitutional
scrutiny and it is therefore, an impermissible infringement upon the defendant's fundamental
constitutional rights.
Even under a rational basis review, the group crime enhancement statute is an

unconstitutional violation of defendant's substantive due process rights It is simply not "rationally
related to some legitimate governmental interest " San Antonio School District v Rodriguez. 411
US. 1,44(1973)
In Labrum III, the Court of Appeals rationalized that the group crime enhancement was
enacted by the legislature due to the heightened danger of committing crimes in groups Labrum
Ul at note 8. However, if it was danger to individuals that the legislature hoped to address, it
would have been more rational to enforce stricter punishments on those that commit crimes that
actually result in harm. For example, in a trial recently held in the Fourth District Court, State v
Brad Norton. Norton was convicted of aggravated assault, a second degree felony The evidence
at trial showed that Mr Norton, stabbed a man in the stomach with a knife. The stabbing was so
serious that when the victim arrived at the hospital, part of his bowels were protrudingfromhis
abdomen. Mr. Norton has not yet been sentenced.
When sentenced, the most jail time Mr. Norton will receive will be an indeterminate term
of years of one to 15 years in prison. If the group crime enhancement is imposed, Mr Norton
may receive a minimum term of six years.
In this case, on the other hand, no serious or life threatening injury occurred. In fact, the
evidence shows that Mr. Villalobos did not actually confront the victims during the course of the
burglary. While no life threatening or serious injury occurred, Mr. Villalobos faces a minimum of
nine years in prison if the group crime enhancement is imposed, a full 50% longer than the prison
sentence faced by Mr. Norton and a full nine times longer than the prison sentence faced by Mr
Norton should the group crime enhancement not be imposed on Mr. Norton.
A sentencing scheme which would impose a sentence nine times longer on an individual
because that individual committed a crime with a "potential" for harm, despite the fact that no real

injury occurred, compared to an individual who committed a crime which resulted in serious
personal injury, is not based on reason and cannot be explained on any rational basis. Instead, a
rational sentencing scheme should first take into account the amount of harm actually done by the
criminal defendant. Only after stratifying crimes based upon the actual harm done, should the
sentences be stratified based upon the potential for harm.
VI; THE GROUP CRIME ENHANCEMENT STATUTE VIOLATES THE
UNIFORM OPERATION OF LAWS PROVISION OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION
Both the Utah Constitution and the United States Constitution demand that "persons
similarly situated should be treated similarly... ." Malan v Lewis. 693 P.2d 661, 669 (Utah 1984).
Moreover. u[b]asic principles of equal protection of the law are inherent in the very concept of
justice and are a necessary attribute of a just society." Malan, 693 P.2d at 670. In a concurring
opinion to Railway Express Agency Inc. v. New York. 336 U.S. 106, 113 (1949), Justice Robert
Jackson stated: "Courts can take no better measure to assure that laws will be just than to require
that laws be equal in operation."
A. THE GROUP CRIME ENHANCEMENT STATUTE VIOLATES THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that "[n]o state
shall make or enforce any law which shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." Equal Protection analysis under the federal constitution is centered
around two basic ideas: (1) suspect classification and (2) fundamental rights. The group crime
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enhancement statute as set forth in Utah Code Annotated §76-3-203 1 places an impermissible
burden upon defendant's exercise of fundamental rights and denies him equal protection of the
law Defendant has a constitutionally protected right to freely associate, to not be subjected to
cruel and unusual punishment, and to not be deprived of liberty without due process of law See
supra. The group crime enhancement statute facially deprives criminal defendants of equal
protection with its infringement upon fundamental rights and because it arbitrarily and
unreasonably isolates themfromthe larger class of criminal defendants solely because they
conceivably did not commit a crime alone.
Because the statute encroaches upon fundamental rights, it must be reviewed under a strict
scrutiny standard. As set forth above, under an analysis of due process, § 76-3-203.1 fails such
constitutional scrutiny as well as a lesser rational basis review.
B. THE GROUP CRIME ENHANCEMENT STATUTE VIOLATES THE
UNIFORM OPERATIONS OF LAW PROVISION OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution contains a uniform operation of laws
provision. "[a]ll laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." While this provision
embodies the same principles as the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, there are
important differences between the two laws. In Malan v Lewis. 693 P.2d 661, 669 (Utah 1984),
the Utah Supreme Court defined the general principle of both the state and federal constitutions
as "persons similarly situated should be treated similarly, and persons in different circumstances
should not be treated as if their circumstances were the same." Accordingly, two criminal
defendants in similair situations, charged and convicted of the same offenses, should be treated
similarly, not given disproportionate sentences solely on the basis of whether they committed the
crime alone or "in concert with two or more persons."
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In Maiao, the Utah Supreme Court held that construction and application of Article I,
Section 24 is "not controlled by the federal courts' construction and application of the Equal
Protection Clause"; and that though "[c]ase law developed under the Fourteenth Amendment may
be persuasive in applying Article I, § 24... that law is not binding so long as we do not reach a
result that violated the Equal Protection Clause." Malan 693 P.2d at 669 (emphasis added).
Although the courts in Utah have never decided a case wherein a statute passed equal
protection muster, yet failed under the uniform operation of laws provision, they have repeatedly
demonstrated a willingness to interpret textually similar state constitutional provisions in a manner
different from federal interpretations of the United States Constitution. See State v. Larocco. 794
P.2d 460 (Utah 1990); State v Watts. 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988); and State v Hugh. 711 P.2d
264 (Utah 1985). Divergence from federal interpretation has been viewed as both appropriate and
necessary when viewing particular provisions. In reviewing this statute, the court should not
hesitate to uphold Utah's uniform operation provisions and its greater protections.
In Malan v Lewis, the Utah Supreme Court stated that "Article I, § 24 protects against
two types of discrimination. First, a law must apply equally to all persons within a class. Second,
the statutory classifications and the different treatment given the classes must be based on
differences that have a reasonable tendency to further the objectives of the state. If the
relationship of the classification to the statutory objectives is unreasonable or fanciful, the
discrimination is unreasonable." Malan. 693 P.2d at 670, 671 (citations omitted). The Supreme
Court in Blue Cross and Blue Shield v State of Utah. 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1989) set out the
analytical process for determining whether a particular statutory provision complies with the
constitutional mandate. In scrutinizing a legislative measure under Article I, Section 24, we must
determine whether the classification is reasonable, whether the objectives of the legislative action
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are legitimate, and whether there is a reasonable relationship between the classification and the
legislative purposes Id.
However, in Condemarin v University Hospital. 775 P 2d 348 (Utah 1989), the Supreme
Court of Utah held that certain provisions of the State Governmental Immunity Act which
imposed limits on the amount a person could claim against uninsured government entities because
of death or injury violated the uniform operations of laws and due process provisions of the Utah
Constitution In separate opinions, the court applied a stricter standard of review to the statute
than the traditional rational basis review Justice Durham, in an opinion concurred in part by
Justices Zimmerman and Stewart stated:
"The states asks this Court to engage in the kind of speculation about legislative
rationale associated with the 'any conceivable rational basis test.' However,
because of the constitutional status of the right to a remedy for damage to one's
person under article I, section II, more is required.... The greater the intrusion
upon constitutionally protected interest, the greater and more explicit the state's
reasons must be."
Id at 358 The group crime enhancement statute facially deprives criminal defendants of equal
protection with its infringement upon state constitutional rights and because it arbitrarily and
unreasonably isolates themfromthe larger class of criminal defendants solely because they
conceivably did not commit a crime alone.
Even under a lower standard of "reasonableness," the group crime enhancement statute
violates the uniform operations of law provision. While the state's interest in protecting the public
from group crimes is legitimate, its application to all criminal defendants who act "in concert with
two or more persons" is neither a reasonable classification nor is there a reasonable relationship
between the classification and the legislative objective-particularly when the other persons
allegedly involved need not be charged or even identified.

As stated earlier, persons similarly situated are not treated in a similar manner. The codefendants in this case have not had the group crime enhancement imposed upon them. Further,
only three criminal defendants have borne the brunt of the group crime enhancement in Utah
County. Such disparate treatment creates a fundamental unfairness that must not be tolerated by
this court.
VH. THE CONDUCT OF THE PROSECUTOR IN THIS CASE CONSTITUTES
A VIOLATION OF THE DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS AND THUS THE
GROUP CRIME ENHANCEMENT STATUTE SHOULD NOT BE IMPOSED.
As discussed earlier, both the Utah and the United States Constitutions protect the due
processrightsof a criminal defendant. In this case, the prosecuting attorney offered plea bargains
to the co-defendants of this defendant. As a result of those plea bargains, those co-defendants
will not be subjected to the enhanced penalty of §76-6-203.1. Mr. Villalobos, however, was not
offered any plea agreement. The prosecuting attorney has stated that the reason that he did not
offer a plea agreement to this defendant is that he did not make a confession and because he was a
"known" member of a street gang. In other words, he exercised hisrightto remain silent and his
right of association.
In North Carolina v Pearce. 395 U.S. 711 (1969), a defendant was convicted and
sentenced to a prison term. After winning his appeal and after being reconvicted, the defendant
was sentenced to a more lengthy prison term. The Supreme Court held that his second sentence
violated his due processrightsbecause he was being punished for exercising hisrightto an appeal.
In Bordenkircher v Hayes. 434 U.S. 357 (1978), a prosecutor told a criminal defendant that if the
defendant did not accept a plea bargain, the prosecutor would reindict him on more serious
charges. The Supreme Court held that such conduct was not a violation of the defendant's due

process rights. In so ruling, however, the Court was careful to state that prosecutors did not have
unfettered discretion. The Court stated, "[t]hough to punish a person because he has done what
the law allows violates due process, there is no such element of punishment in the "give-and-take"
of plea bargaining as long as the accused is free to accept or reject the prosecutor's offer."
Bordenkircher at 357 (citation omitted). The Court went on to state, "[tjhere is no doubt that the
breadth of discretion that our country's legal system vests in prosecuting attorneys carries with it
the potential for both individual and institutional abuse. And broad though that discretion may be,
there are undoubtedly constitutional limits upon its exercise." Bordenkircher at 364. The
Supreme Court explained the differences between the Pearce and the Bordenkircher cases. The
Court pointed out that in Bordenkircher. the prosecutor was attempting to discourage the
defendant from exercising his constitutional rights in the future. In PearceT on the other hand, the
defendant was being penalized for exercising his constitutional rights in the past. Bordenkircher at
362-63.
In this case, Mr. Villalobos is being punished for exercising past constitutional rights. In
his letter, the prosecuting attorney explained that Mr. Villalobos was singled out from the codefendants because he refused to give a video confession or otherwise cooperate with the police.
In other words, because Mr. Villalobos exercised hisrightto remain silent, he was not offered a
plea bargain. Similarly, the prosecutor refused to offer a plea bargain to Mr. Villalobos because
he was a "known" gang member. In other words, since the prosecutor believed that Mr.
Villalobos had associated with street gang members, Mr. Villalobos was offered a plea bargain.
As discussed above, therightof association is a constitutional right. By punishing Mr. Villalobos
for exercising thatright,Mr. Villalobos' due processrightshave been violated.
In order to remedy that wrong, this court should, in effect, give Mr. Villalobos the plea

bargain which was offered to the co-defendants The gang enhancement penalty should not be
imposed.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the arguments set forth above, Viilalobos requests that this courtfindUtah
Code Annotated § 76-3-203.1 unconstitutional.
Respectfully submitted this 14th day of September, 1998.

Nelson Abbott
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Defendant.
This case is before the court on defendant's motion to declare Utah Code Arm. §
76-3-203.1 unconstitutional, either on its face or as applied to him in this case. Defendant
assails the statute on a host of grounds and hasfileda lengthy brief The State responded
with a similar lengthy analysis. I received argument on October 13, 1998, and now issue
this ruling denying the motion.
The heart of defendant's complaint about the statute is that he faces the potential
of a group crime enhancement while the prosecution allowed two codefendants to plead
guilty to the same offense but the State agreed not to seek the group crime enhancement.
This part of defendant's analysis is simply wrong. Defendant is not being illtreated because he stood on his constitutional right to remain silent, thus forcing a jury
trial, while the two codefendants each plead guilty, thus waiving theirrightto remain
silent. Rather, defendant faces a sentence with the same maximum potential penalty the
two codefendants faced. That they received a probationary sentence rather than a prison
1
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commitment has much to do with their individual and separate criminal histories and their
recognition of their own wrongful conduct, thus evidencing a significant potential for
rehabilitiation. Defendant, who has yet to be sentenced, will receive an appropriate
sentence given the nature of his background and criminal history, his willingness to
acknowledge his wrongful conduct and other appropriate aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. I have not yet made a decision of the appropriate sentence for defendant,
but will do so without any notion that he receive some greater penalty because he chose
not to waive hisrightto remain silent and confess. In fact, the maximum penalty which
defendant faces is no greater than the maximum penalty which the codefendants faced
when they stood in the well of the court to be sentenced.
In considering the constitutionality of the group enhancement statute, I note that
neither appellate court in Utah has resolved all of the constitutional arguments raised by
defendant In State v. Ramirez, 948 P.2d 375 (Utah App. 1997), the court of appeals did
rule on whether it is unconstitutional for the sentencing judge to make the factual findings
necessary for application of the group crime enhancement. It resolved those issues
adverse to defendant here. It doesn't appear, however, that any of the other constitutional
arguments put forth by defendant have been considered by the appellate courts.1 As noted
in State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454, 466 (Utah App. 1993), "[generally, we presume the
constitutionality of a statute, and defendant, as challenger, has the burden to demonstrate

1

Apparently the defendant in State v. Labrum, 959 P.2d 120 (Utah App. 1998), attacked the
constitutionality of the group crime enhancement statute. When the issue was before it, however, the Utah
Court of Appeals was able to reach a resolution of the appeal on straightforward statutory grounds and did
not reach the constitutional issue.
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its unconstitutionality. . . . We, therefore, apply this presumption of deference to
legislative determinations designating penal sanctions." 846 P.2d at 466 (citations
omitted). Further, as noted in State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 995 (Utah 1995), in "ruling
on the constitutionality of a statute, we will resolve doubts in favor of constitutionality."
In this case defendant claims that the statute is unconstitutional. He has the burden
of persuading the court that the statute should be struck down. I have considered all of
the arguments made by counsel and have read the cases cited in the briefs. I simply do not
find merit to defendant's attacks on the constitutionality of the statute as it is written.
The bulk of defendant's argument, however, is that as applied to him, the statute is
unconstitutional as he asserts that he was treated differently than the codefendants. Giving
appropriate deference to the legislature, and resolving any doubts in favor of upholding
the statute, I conclude that in applying this statute to the defendant, the prosecution has
not acted impermissibly or unconstitutionally. Defendant will not receive a greater
maximum penalty than any either of the codefendants who plead guilty to the same crime
on which the jury found defendant guilty. Rather, the sentencing decisions for them were
based on their individual circumstances. That will be the case for defendant as well.
I deny the motion to declare the statute unconstitutional. The prosecutor is
directed to prepare an appropriate order.
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Addendum C

77-18-1. Suspension of sentence — Pleas held in abeyance
— Probation — Supervision — Presentence investigation — Standards — Confidentiality —
Terms and conditions — Restitution — Termination, revocation, modification, or extension —
Hearings — Electronic monitoring.
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction
with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as
provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the
plea in abeyance agreement.
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction
of any crime or offense, the court may suspend the imposition or execution
of sentence and place the defendant on probation. The court may place the
defendant:
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions;
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a
private organization; or
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing
court,
(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the
department is with the department.
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of
the sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court. The court has
continuing jurisdiction over all probationers.
(3) (a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence investigation standards for all individuals referred to the department. These
standards shall be based on:
(i) the type of offense;
(ii) the demand for services;
(iii) the availability of agency resources;
(iv) the public safety; and
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what
level of services shall be provided.
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an
annual basis for review and comment prior to adoption by the department.
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures
to implement the supervision and investigation standards.
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider
modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3) (a)
and other criteria as they consider appropriate.
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an
impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations
subcommittee.
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required
to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors
or infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C
misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may supervise the
probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards.
(5) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of
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sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a
presentence investigation report from the department or information from
other sources about the defendant.
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact
statement describing the effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's
family. The victim impact statement shall:
(i) identify the victim of the offense;
(ii) include a specific statement of the recommended amount of
complete restitution as defined in Subsection 76-3-201(4), accompanied by a recommendation from the department regarding the payment of court-ordered restitution as defined in Subsection 76-3-201(4)
by the defendant;
(iii) identify any physical injury suffered by the victim as a result of
the offense along with its seriousness and permanence;
(iv) describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial
relationships as a result of the offense;
(v) identify any request for psychological services initiated by the
victim or the victim's family as a result of the offense; and
(vi) contain any other information related to the impact of the
offense upon the victim or the victim's family that is relevant to the
trial court's sentencing determination.
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the
department regarding the payment of restitution with interest by the
defendant in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4).
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any
diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404,
are protected and are not available except by court order for purposes of
sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the
department.
(6) (a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report
to the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel,
the prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to
sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation
report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the department
prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing
judge, and the judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve
the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten
working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make a
determination of relevance and accuracy on the record.
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered
to be waived.
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence,
or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present
concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant.
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the defendant:
(a) may be required to perform any or all of the following:
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being
placed on probation;
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense
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(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally
liable;
(iv) participate in available treatment programs;
(v) serve a period of time in the county jail not to exceed one year;
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use
of electronic monitoring;
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, including the compensatory service program provided in Section 78-1120.7;
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment
services;
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with
interest in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4); and
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers
appropriate; and
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997, shall be required to:
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation diploma, a GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the
defendant's own expense if the defendant has not received the
diploma, GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior to being
placed on probation; or
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items
listed in Subsection (8XbXi) because of:
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or
(B) other justified cause.
(9) The department, upon order of the court, shall collect and disburse fines,
restitution with interest in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4), and any
other costs assessed under Section 64-13-21 during:
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance
with Subsection 77-27-6(4); and
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised
probation and any extension of that period by the department in accordance with Subsection 77-18-1(10).
(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B
or C misdemeanors or infractions.
(ii) If the defendant, upon expiration or termination of the probation period, owes outstanding fines, restitution, or other assessed
costs, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the
defendant on bench probation or place the defendant on bench
probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of fines,
restitution, including interest, if any, in accordance with Subsection
76-3-201(4), and other amounts outstanding.
(iii) Upon motion of the prosecutor or victim, or upon its own
motion, the court may require the defendant to show cause why his
failure to pay should not be treated as contempt of court or why the
suspended jail or prison term should not be imposed.
(b) The department shall notify the sentencing court and prosecuting
attorney in writing in advance in all cases when termination of supervised
probation will occur by law. The notification shall include a probation
progress report and complete report of details on outstanding fines,
restitution, and other amounts outstanding.
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(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing
to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total
probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to
revoke the probation.
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated
at the hearing.
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or
warrant by the court.
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver
of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in
court that the probationer has violated the conditions of probation.
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court
and a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated.
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts
asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the
court that authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit
establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or
extension of probation is justified.
(ii) Ifthe court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to
be served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the
affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should not be
revoked, modified, or extended.
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the
hearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior
to the hearing.
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance.
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right
to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel
appointed for him if he is indigent.
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present
evidence.
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations
of the affidavit.
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations.
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to
questioning by the defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders.
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own
behalf, and present evidence.
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact.
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of
probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified,
continued, or that the entire probation term commence anew.
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the
sentence previously imposed shall be executed.
(13) Restitution imposed under this chapter and interest accruing in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4) is considered a debt for willful and mah-
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injury for purposes of exceptions listed to discharge in bankruptcy as
provided in Title 11 U S C A Sec 523, 1985
(14) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of
the Division of Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a
condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the superintendent of the
Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified to the court that
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at
the state hospital,
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant, and
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-12-209(2Xg) are receiving priority for treatment over the defendants described in this Subsection (14)
(15) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic
evaluations, are classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2,
Government Records Access and Management Act Notwithstanding Sections
63-2-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the
disclosure of a presentence investigation report Except for disclosure at the
time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the
presentence investigation only when
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7),
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by
the department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of
the offender,
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole,
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or
the subject's authorized representative, or
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence
investigation report or the victim's authorized representative, provided
that the disclosure to the victim shall include only information relating to
statements or materials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the
crime including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the crime
on the victim or the victim's household
(16) (a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of
probation under the supervision of the department, except as provided in
Sections 76a~406 and 76-5-406 5
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home
confinement, including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred
to the department in accordance with Subsection (17)
(17) (a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it
may order the defendant to participate in home confinement through the
use of electronic monitoring as described in this section until further order
of the court
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the
appropriate law enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions
which require
d) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all
times, and
(n) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the
defendant's compliance with the court's order may be monitored
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement
through electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this
section, it shall
d) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the
Department of Corrections,
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(n) order the department to place an electronic monitoring deviCe
on the defendant and install electronic monitoring equipment in the
residence of the defendant, and
(in) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with hoin e
confinement to the department or the program provider
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through
electronic monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to
be indigent by the court
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described i n
this section either directly or by contract with a private provider
History: C 1953, 77-18-1, enacted by L.
1980, ch 15, ft 2; 1981, ch 59, $ 2; 1982, ch.
9, ft 1; 1983, ch. 47, ft 1; 1983, ch 68, ft 1;
1983, ch 85, ft 2; 1984, ch. 20, ft 1; 1985, ch.
212, ft 17; 1985, ch 229, ft 1; 1987, ch 114,
ft 1; 1989, ch 226, ft 1; 1990, ch. 134, ft 2;
1991, ch 66,ft5; 1991, ch 206,ft6; 1992, ch.
14, ft 3; 1993, ch 82, ft 7; 1993, ch. 220, ft 3;
1994, ch 13, ft 24; 1994, ch. 198, ft 1; 1994,
ch. 230, ft 1; 1995, ch. 20, ft 146; 1995, ch.
117,ft2; 1995, ch. 184, ft 1; 1996, ch. 301,ft3;
1995, ch 337, ft 11; 1995, ch. 352, ft 6; 1996,
ch 79, ft 103; 1997, ch. 392, ft 2; 1998, ch. 94,
ft 10.
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you wish to make today.
THE DEFENDANT:

First of all, I want to say

that Ifm sorry for the pain that the victims have
suffered.

I've been in jail awhile and Ifve been doing

a lot of thinking about what I want to do in life, and
if I keep messing up or whatever, that I'll do a lot of
time in prison.

I probably will end up going to prison.

Like I say -- I'll tell the Court, I plan on going to
college, and if I go to prison -- I've been doing like a
lot of stuff in jail, going to a lot of classes,
programs, life skill classes.
Foothill program.

I just started the

I've learned a lot about myself being

in jail and what I want to do with my life if I have
another chance.
I have a job waiting for me outside.

I

wanted to ask if I do get sentenced to prison, if there
would be any chance I could finish the Foothill program.
It's a three month to six month program, depending upon
how fast I get through it.

I know I need help with

problems I have, values I have.
MR. ABBOTT:

That's pretty much it.

Judge, I just wanted to point

out a few things with the presentence investigative
report.
THE COURT:
MR. ABBOTT:

Go ahead.
On page 2 it indicates in there
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that Mr. Villalobos stole an automobile prior to this
crime.

Itfs my understanding the evidence at trial was

that William Screws and Jeff Richman stole that vehicle,
MR. TAYLOR:

Actually I don't believe that

was the evidence at trial.

I believe the evidence was

that Screws, Richman and Villalobos were all together
when the car was taken.
THE COURT:
MR. ABBOTT:

Thank you.
I was not trial counsel, so I

hope I have not misstated the evidence on that.
MR. TAYLOR:

I would refer the court to the

findings of fact as far as Gang Enhancement, Finding
Number 2.
THE COURT:
MR. ABBOTT:

Thank you.
The other issue is on page 3.

It talks about $3,000 in computer equipment.

It's my

understanding the evidence at trial indicated it was
maybe a couple hundred dollars, plus a Nintendo.

A

Nintendo probably doesn't cost a few thousand dollars.
In fact probably more in lines of a hundred dollars or
two hundred dollars.

So I think the total amount of

damage would probably be more in the line of $3 00 not
$3,000.
On page 8 where it talks about employment,
there was other employment at Intermountain Temporaries
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and at the last hearing we had Mr. Babbitt, who had
given Marcos some pool related work, although it was
several years ago, it's my understanding also
Mr. Villalobos has also done some other odd jobs in here
in that time period.
And then on the Criminal History Assessment,
they've checked number "2," which means a weapon,
Mr. Villalobos was carrying some kind of weapon that's
"other."

I imagine that's got to be a board or

something like that.

It's my understanding at trial the

evidence was not that Mr. Villalobos was carrying any
type of weapon.

So that should be a "zero" rather than

a "2" which would drop him from a 12 to a 10 and put him
in the Moderate category, rather than the Fair category.
If it's in the Moderate, that's five years under the
time matrix.
THE COURT:
MR. ABBOTT:

Go ahead.
I just wanted to point out also,

obviously Mr. Villalobos has made some wrong decisions.
He's admitted to that and expressed some remorse, but
we've also had an incredible outpouring of love from
friends and family and I think that does demonstrate he
has family support and people to back him when he is
released.

In jail he's indicated that he's enrolled

himself in the Foothill Treatment Program, and is
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interested in pursuing that.
He's also obtained his GED -- Ifve got the

2
3

certificate here -- while he f s been in jail, and he has

4

made strides and expressed his desire to change his life

5

and to turn it around and not engage in this type of

6

behavior in the future.

7

assert that 9 to life is simply too long.

8

32 if he were released under that.

9

leniency by this court, and obviously he is in need of

We would simply ask, Judge, or
He would be

We would ask for

10

some treatment and some rehabilitation, but we would ask

11

for some leniency, and ask for a sentence not only more

12

commensurate with the crime he committed but

13

commensurate with his expressed desire to change his

14

life.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. TAYLOR:

Mr. Taylor.
In regards to the weapon, there

17

were three specific separate weapons introduced at

18

trial, and there was a crowbar type of weapon and a pipe

19

and a 2x4 with nails.

20

did not have a weapon at all.

21

was there, he didn't step inside, or Mr. Houston.

22

leaves this defendant and two others, and three weapons.

23

Even so, if the court concludes he didn't have a weapon,

24

and changes his placement score, that reduces him to

25

moderate.

The testimony was Mr. Fonohema
The evidence was, if he
That

But because of the nature of the crime he is
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still in the prison range.

So it doesn't significantly

alter the disposition.
THE COURT:

The only thing it may alter, if

the Court made a finding he did not use a weapon, it may
be sufficient that the Board of Pardons would treat it
different.
MR. TAYLOR:
THE COURT:

That's correct.
It would not alter what category

on the matrix he falls, that's correct.
MR. TAYLOR:

What the Board of Pardons will

do in this case depends upon huge measure the Defendant
himself, how he behaves if he is sentenced to prison.
It is a tragedy that this young man is looking at a huge
part of his life being taken away by spending it in
prison.

On the other hand, it's been as a direct result

of the defendant's actions.

Everyone who came in has

told us he made bad choices, bad conduct.

It would be

wrong to let him escape the consequence of those
choices.
MR. ABBOTT:

I don't mean to misstate the

evidence, but it was my understanding the evidence
didn't show he had a weapon.
THE COURT:
MR. TAYLOR:

Thank you.
There were findings of fact

submitted on the Gang Enhancement.

I have no indication
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those have been executed.
THE COURT:

They have not been.

I'm going to

take a short recess and then come back and announce
sentence.
(Recess held)
THE COURT:

This is the time set for

sentencing, pursuant to a finding of guilt on a jury
verdict entered on the 14th of July of this year, in
which the Defendant, Marco Villalobos, was found guilty
of Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree Felony and the
crime of Receiving Stolen Property, a Second Degree
Felony.
In this matter the question before the court
is what is an appropriate sentence to be imposed.

Ifm

going to speak first to the Group Crime Enhancement.
I've carefully reviewed, Mr. Villalobos and Mr. Abbott,
the issue of Group Crime Enhancement.

In this matter I

do find that the Defendant participated with two or more
others; in this case Mr. Screws, Mr. Richman,
Mr. Houston and Mr. Fonohema in entering the residence.
The evidence was that Mr. Houston only went to the door,
and for that reason I guess the jury did not convict him
of the aggravated robbery.

But both Mr. Screws and

Mr. Richman have plead guilty to the charge of
aggravated robbery, and Mr. Fonohema admitted on the
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stand at trial he participated.
For that reason I am going to find this was a
crime committed by a group within the definition of
76-3-201.

I previously made a finding that that statute

is not unconstitutional.

While making those findings

however, I believe that in the interests of justice it
is not appropriate in this case to impose a Group Crime
Enhancement.

I do that for the reason that, first, no

other defendant in this case has had to face a Group
Crime Enhancement.

It's not unconstitutional for me to

impose a Group Crime Enhancement, but I believe it is
noteworthy that no other participate in this action has
had to face a Group Crime Enhancement.
MR. TAYLOR:

So the Court is aware,

Mr. Houston has not been sentenced.
THE COURT:

I thought we sentenced him and

put him on probation, I thought.
MR. TAYLOR:
THE COURT:

I don't have his file here.
Mr. Houston was sentenced, yeah.

Secondly, my view of Mr. Villalobos is he is
quite young.

My information is he's recently turned 23.

It seems to me he's a relatively young 23, lacking some
in maturity.

I don't say that critically, but it's

simply my view, Mr. Villalobos, you've got a lot of your
youth about you to the point that I think it would be --
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his relative youth and the fact that no other defendant
has been sentenced to an enhanced crime in this matter,
I think justify a finding that it would be in the
interests of justice not to impose the Group Crime
Enhancement and I decline to impose the Group Crime
Enhancement.
I have listened carefully, Mr. Villalobos, to
the testimony offered by many friends and family; many
of whom spoke about the fact that when they knew you,
you didnft do things like this.

None of them, however,

were present the night of the offense.

And the evidence

at trial is that you, along with other co-defendants,
entered the homes of the victims with three weapons, a
pipe, a crowbar and a 2x4 with a nail in it, and
demanded money and property, and thereafter made an
escape.

And for that reason, I think that imposition of

a sentence is appropriate in this matter.

I've reviewed

your criminal history, and unfortunately it's not a
particularly helpful criminal history, and that also
justifies an appropriate sentence in this matter.

Much

of that criminal history includes offenses that have
occurred since you've been an adult.
It therefore will be the order and judgment
the Court that the defendant, Marco Villalobos, having
been found guilty, by a jury, of Aggravated Robbery, a
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First Degree Felony, be sentenced to serve an
indeterminate term in the Utah State Prison of not less
than five years, and which maybe for life; and further,
having been found guilty of Receiving Stolen Property, a
Second Degree Felony, the defendant be sentenced to
serve an indeterminate term in the Utah State Prison of
not less than one year, nor more than 15 years.

Ifm

going to allow those sentences to run concurrent, one
with another.

Ifm going to recommend that the Board of

Pardons give you credit for any time you've served in
custody since you were arrested in this matter, which I
know is eight or nine months; maybe slightly more than
that.

I'm going to recommend that the board of pardons

make available to you appropriate drug treatment and an
opportunity for educational enhancement.

You will still

in many aspects be a relatively young person when you
get out of prison.

And I would urge you use the time in

prison to improve yourself meaningfully and in
constructive ways so when you get out of prison you'll
have something more to offer society, and really
something more to offer yourself than where you've been
so far.
That will be the order and judgment of the
court.

You have the right to appeal the sentence you've

just had imposed.
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MR. TAYLOR:

The State would request

restitution.
THE COURT:

I neglected to mention that.

In this matter I will make a finding you owe
$314.
MR. TAYLOR:
THE COURT:

May I be heard on that briefly?
You may.

MR. TAYLOR:

I looked, and it's not in this

presentence investigation, but there was a letter from
the victim in this case that was attached to the
presentence report for Mr. McDonald who was a
co-defendant in the other case involving the same
defendant, where they carefully listed out the values of
items take on both robberies.

They are detailed there.

I don't know why that letter wasn't included in this
presentence report, but it has been reported and we
simply had a different PSI writer.
because of that.

I'm concerned

That amount hasn't been appropriately

placed before the court.
THE COURT:

My order would be that

restitution be paid and I'll defer on that until you and
Mr. Abbott have an opportunity to review that.

And if

not, I'll impose one consistent with that letter, and if
not we'll set it for restitution hearing.
So I will order, Mr. Villalobos that you pay
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restitution to the victims, somewhere in an amount not
less than $341.11, and it can be more when we find out
what the exact numbers are.
I will direct that either party may file a
written request for restitution hearing.
that matter resolved promptly.

I would like

Ifm going to direct that

the matter be resolved by either agreement or request
for restitution hearing within 30 days.
MR. TAYLOR:

That's fine.

We still have, a

sentencing pending in the other matter before Judge
Hansen.

And I will make that known.
THE COURT:

Restitution will be ordered.

defendant's commitment to prison will be ordered.

The

You

have a right, Mr. Villalobos to appeal the jury verdict,
in finding you guilty, and you have the right to appeal
the sentence.

Either way, it would need to be in

writing before 3 0 days.
it's too late.

If you go later than 3 0 days

Do you understand that, sir?

MR. ABBOTT: Yes.
THE COURT:

I decline to enter any fine. It

seems to me if Mr. Villalobos serves the time as
prescribed, it would be unduly burdening when he gets
out of prison.

That will be the order in this matter.

(Proceedings concluded.)
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